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Abstract	  	   Two	  experiments	  examined	  memory	  conformity	  in	  an	  eyewitness	  context	  where	  it	  can	  have	  devastating	  effects.	  The	  aim	  of	  these	  experiments	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  state	  anxiety	  (Experiment	  1)	  and	  trait	  anxiety	  (Experiment	  2)	  affect	  memory	  conformity.	  Experiment	  1	  revealed	  that	  state	  anxiety	  was	  resistant	  to	  influence	  from	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  identification	  decision,	  precluding	  a	  test	  of	  state	  anxiety's	  effect	  on	  memory	  conformity	  in	  this	  context.	  Experiment	  2	  examined	  anxiety	  as	  a	  dispositional	  variable	  by	  testing	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  social	  avoidance	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  the	  first	  phase,	  participants	  completed	  a	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety	  and	  viewed	  60	  photographs	  of	  faces.	  Later	  that	  week,	  participants	  were	  paired	  and	  asked	  to	  look	  through	  120	  photos	  and	  indicate	  whether	  the	  photos	  were	  old	  (previously	  seen)	  or	  new	  (previously	  unseen).	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  three	  conditions:	  no	  
motivation,	  monetary	  incentive,	  or	  forced	  unanimity.	  In	  the	  no	  motivation	  condition,	  participants	  were	  not	  given	  any	  instructions	  beyond	  the	  basic	  task	  instructions.	  Participants	  in	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  condition	  were	  told	  that	  the	  most	  accurate	  participant	  would	  receive	  a	  cash	  reward,	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion	  to	  resolve	  discrepant	  answers,	  should	  any	  occur.	  Overall,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conformed	  significantly	  less	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants,	  and	  conformity	  rates	  were	  significantly	  higher	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  no-­‐
motivation	  and	  monetary	  incentive	  conditions.	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Social	  Anxiety	  and	  Memory	  Conformity	  in	  Eyewitnesses	  	   Eyewitness	  misidentification	  is	  the	  leading	  cause	  of	  wrongful	  convictions	  in	  the	  Untied	  States	  (The	  Innocence	  Project,	  2012).	  Of	  the	  297	  wrongfully	  convicted	  people	  who	  have	  been	  exonerated	  by	  DNA	  evidence,	  over	  75%	  were	  convicted	  using	  incorrect	  eyewitness	  identifications	  (Garrett,	  2011).	  In	  his	  book,	  Convicting	  the	  
Innocent	  Brandon	  Garrett	  evaluated	  the	  first	  250	  cases	  of	  people	  who	  have	  been	  exonerated	  by	  DNA	  evidence.	  In	  his	  chapter	  on	  eyewitness	  misidentification,	  Garrett	  states	  that	  suggestive	  identification	  procedures	  and	  unreliable	  identifications	  emerge	  as	  recurring	  themes	  in	  misidentification	  cases.	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  161	  cases	  for	  which	  he	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  trial	  information,	  Garrett	  found	  evidence	  that	  police	  were	  responsible	  for	  contaminating	  eyewitness	  identification	  in	  78%	  of	  the	  cases.	  Within	  these	  cases,	  police	  used	  biased	  procedures	  such	  as	  single	  person	  showups,	  constructed	  biased	  lineups,	  or	  made	  suggestive	  comments	  to	  eyewitnesses	  after	  identification	  procedures.	  In	  each	  instance,	  eyewitness	  memory	  was	  contaminated	  and	  a	  witness’s	  original	  recollection	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  was	  damaged.	  	  	   Conformity	  to	  an	  errant	  co-­‐witness	  can	  have	  profound	  deleterious	  effects	  on	  witnesses,	  victims,	  suspects,	  and	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  our	  justice	  system;	  therefore,	  researchers	  must	  examine	  the	  social	  variables	  and	  individual	  differences	  that	  foster	  memory	  conformity	  among	  eyewitnesses.	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  demonstrates	  that	  numerous	  variables	  give	  rise	  to	  memory	  conformity	  and	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  given	  variable	  differs	  as	  a	  function	  of	  circumstance	  and	  individual	  differences.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  to	  1)	  identify	  the	  variables	  that	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give	  rise	  to	  memory	  conformity	  and	  2)	  to	  explore	  how	  nuanced	  situational	  factors	  and	  individual	  differences	  affect	  an	  individual’s	  susceptibility	  to	  memory	  conformity.	  	  	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  present	  study	  is	  to	  examine	  memory	  malleability	  as	  a	  function	  of	  conformity	  to	  others	  and	  as	  a	  function	  of	  individual	  differences	  in	  social	  anxiety.	  I	  will	  begin	  by	  discussing	  the	  social	  variables	  that	  effect	  memory	  conformity	  among	  eyewitnesses	  and	  then	  move	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  anxiety	  on	  eyewitnesses.	  Discussion	  will	  subsequently	  narrow	  on	  social	  avoidance	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  could	  potentially	  increase,	  decrease,	  or	  eliminate	  the	  tendency	  of	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  to	  (unwittingly)	  succumb	  to	  memory	  conformity.	  	  	  
Developing	  False	  Memories	  	  	   Memory	  is	  malleable	  and	  can	  be	  manipulated	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  For	  over	  two	  decades,	  researchers	  have	  successfully	  manipulated	  participants’	  memories	  such	  that	  participants	  have	  come	  to	  report	  details	  for	  events	  that	  never	  occurred	  (Loftus	  &	  Pickrell,	  1995;	  Lindsay	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  In	  an	  earlier	  study,	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell	  found	  that	  29%	  of	  participants	  reported	  partial	  or	  full	  memories	  for	  a	  childhood	  event	  that	  never	  occurred.	  In	  their	  study,	  researchers	  interviewed	  participant’s	  family	  members	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  events	  from	  the	  participant’s	  childhood,	  and	  subsequently	  put	  together	  a	  booklet	  describing	  four	  childhood	  events:	  three	  events	  that	  had	  occurred,	  and	  one	  event	  that	  did	  not	  occur.	  Each	  participant	  then	  read	  the	  story	  booklet	  that	  had	  been	  designed	  for	  him	  or	  her,	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  write	  what	  he	  or	  she	  remembered	  about	  each	  event,	  with	  the	  option	  of	  reporting,	  “I	  do	  not	  remember”	  (p.	  722).	  Researchers	  found	  that	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participants	  not	  only	  reported	  having	  “memories”	  for	  the	  false	  event,	  but	  also	  reported	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  “clarity”	  of	  the	  false	  memories	  at	  a	  follow	  up	  session,	  two-­‐weeks	  later.	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell	  suggest	  that	  when	  an	  individual	  thinks	  about	  a	  false	  memory,	  the	  false	  memory	  may	  become	  linked	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  or	  experiences	  from	  true	  events	  and	  thus,	  errantly	  integrated	  into	  their	  memory.	  	  The	  findings	  and	  relative	  explanation	  that	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell	  put	  forth	  in	  their	  study	  demonstrate	  that	  entire	  false	  memories	  can	  be	  implanted	  using	  misinformation	  and	  suggest	  that	  once	  a	  false	  memory	  has	  been	  introduced,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  false	  memory	  from	  true	  memories.	  	  	  	   Since	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell	  conducted	  their	  study	  in	  1995,	  additional	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  various	  ways	  that	  false-­‐memories	  can	  be	  implanted.	  Using	  a	  slightly	  different	  research	  paradigm	  than	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell,	  Lindsay	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  conducted	  a	  study	  to	  determine	  what	  effect	  the	  provision	  of	  real	  childhood	  class	  photographs	  would	  have	  on	  the	  development	  of	  false	  memories.	  In	  Lindsay	  et	  al.’s	  study,	  researchers	  met	  with	  individual	  participants	  and	  read	  each	  participant	  three	  narratives	  of	  childhood	  events:	  two	  of	  the	  narratives	  were	  true	  and	  one	  narrative	  described	  a	  pseudo-­‐event	  that	  did	  not	  occur.	  The	  two	  true	  narratives	  referred	  to	  events	  that	  occurred	  between	  Grades	  3-­‐5	  and	  between	  Grades	  5	  and	  six;	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  narrative	  described	  the	  participant’s	  ploy	  to	  put	  Slime	  a	  “brightly	  colored	  gelatinous	  compound”	  in	  his	  or	  her	  teacher’s	  desk	  when	  the	  participant	  was	  in	  Grade	  1	  or	  2	  (p.	  150).	  The	  critical	  manipulation	  in	  this	  study	  was	  that	  half	  of	  the	  participants	  received	  their	  real	  childhood	  class	  photos	  to	  look	  at	  while	  listening	  to	  the	  narratives,	  and	  half	  did	  not.	  After	  listening	  to	  each	  narrative,	  participants	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provided	  three	  ratings:	  1)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  participant	  felt	  he	  or	  she	  was	  “reliving”	  and	  2)	  “remembering”	  the	  event,	  and	  3)	  how	  confident	  he	  or	  she	  was	  that	  “the	  event	  occurred	  as	  described	  in	  the	  narrative”	  (p.	  150).	  	  	   Subsequent	  to	  rating	  their	  memory	  experiences,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  spend	  the	  following	  week	  remembering	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  about	  the	  oldest	  event	  (the	  pseudo-­‐event)	  and	  when	  participants	  returned	  a	  week	  later,	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  recall	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  and	  again,	  rate	  their	  memory	  experience	  (Lindsay	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Based	  on	  their	  recollection	  of	  the	  pseudo-­‐event,	  participants	  were	  rated	  as	  having	  either	  1)	  “no	  images	  or	  memories”,	  2)	  “images	  but	  not	  memories”	  (partial	  
false	  memory),	  or	  3)	  “memories	  of	  putting	  Slime	  in	  the	  teacher’s	  desk.”	  (complete	  
false	  memory)	  (p.	  151).	  	  In	  Lindsay	  et	  al.’s	  study,	  partial	  false	  memories	  refer	  to	  instances	  when	  a	  participant	  speculates	  about	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  or	  “accepts”	  that	  the	  event	  has	  occurred,	  whereas	  a	  participant	  who	  demonstrates	  evidence	  and	  a	  “genuine”	  belief	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  a	  memory	  for	  the	  pseudo-­‐even	  would	  be	  classified	  as	  having	  a	  complete	  false	  memory	  (p.	  149).	  Two	  judges,	  who	  were	  blind	  to	  manipulations,	  were	  responsible	  for	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  participants	  had:	  no	  images	  or	  memories,	  a	  partial	  false	  memory,	  or	  a	  complete	  false	  memory	  for	  the	  pseudo-­‐event.	  	  	   Three	  key	  findings	  emerged	  from	  this	  study	  (Lindsay	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  first	  key	  finding	  is	  that,	  after	  the	  second	  session,	  45.5%	  of	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  given	  a	  class	  photograph	  to	  look	  at	  when	  trying	  to	  recall	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  reported	  having	  either	  images	  but	  no	  memories	  (31.8%),	  or	  memories	  (22.7%)	  for	  the	  pseudo-­‐event.	  	  The	  second	  key	  finding	  is	  that	  78.2%	  of	  participants	  who	  were	  given	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photographs	  reported	  having	  either	  images	  but	  no	  memories	  (13%)	  or	  memories	  (65.2%)	  for	  the	  pseudo-­‐event.	  These	  data	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  mere	  narration	  of	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  is	  enough	  to	  implant	  false	  memories	  in	  participants	  and	  further,	  that	  when	  a	  photograph	  was	  provided	  to	  help	  “jog”	  participant’s	  memories,	  the	  number	  of	  partial	  and	  complete	  false	  memories	  that	  were	  reported	  doubled.	  Lindsay	  et	  al.	  posit	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  false	  memories	  among	  participants	  in	  the	  photo	  condition	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  “perceptual	  details	  from	  the	  photo…may	  have	  been	  subsequently	  been	  blended	  with	  products	  of	  imagination…	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  subjectively	  compelling	  false-­‐memories.”	  (p	  154).	  Lindsay	  et	  al.’s	  (2004)	  contention	  echoes	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrel’s	  (1995)	  notion	  that	  false	  memories	  are	  created	  by	  a	  link	  between	  imagined	  events	  to	  true	  experiences.	  	  	   Last,	  the	  third	  noteworthy	  finding	  to	  emerge	  from	  Lindsay	  et	  al.’s	  (2004)	  study	  was	  that	  participants’	  ratings	  of	  clarity	  for	  the	  pseudo-­‐event,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  confidence	  that	  the	  pseudo-­‐event	  had	  occurred,	  were	  comparable	  to	  their	  ratings	  of	  clarity	  for	  and	  confidence	  in	  true	  events.	  This	  data	  demonstrate	  that	  participant’s	  false	  memories	  are	  comparable	  in	  clarity	  and	  believability	  to	  true	  memories;	  one	  participant	  even	  stated	  “If	  you	  didn’t	  tell	  me	  it	  was	  a	  false	  event,	  I	  would	  have	  left	  here	  thinking	  I	  did	  this”	  (p.	  153).	  In	  a	  legal	  context,	  no	  authority	  figure	  is	  present	  both	  during	  and	  after	  a	  crime	  to	  be	  able	  to	  inform	  a	  witness	  which	  of	  his	  or	  her	  memories	  are	  true,	  and	  which	  are	  false.	  Indeed,	  the	  similarities	  between	  memory	  experiences	  for	  true	  and	  false	  memories	  are	  alarming,	  and	  in	  an	  eyewitness	  context,	  the	  potential	  ramifications	  are	  disconcerting.	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   Other	  researchers	  have	  developed	  alternate	  research	  paradigms	  –	  different	  from	  the	  type	  of	  paradigm	  that	  Loftus	  and	  Pickrell	  (1995)	  and	  Lindsay	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  used	  –	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  additional	  and	  nuanced	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  individual’s	  memory	  can	  change.	  For	  example,	  Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice	  (2000)	  conducted	  a	  study	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  that	  misinformation	  has	  on	  memory	  when	  the	  misinformation	  is	  presented	  by	  another	  participant.	  In	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  study,	  pairs	  of	  participants	  viewed	  a	  storybook	  that	  consisted	  of	  21	  photos	  that	  showed	  two	  men	  entering	  a	  snooker	  hall,	  playing	  snooker,	  and	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  two	  men’s	  game,	  the	  storybook	  showed	  a	  woman	  stealing	  one	  man’s	  wallet.	  The	  critical	  manipulation	  was	  that	  there	  were	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  slide	  that	  depicted	  the	  two	  men	  playing	  snooker:	  one	  version	  showed	  the	  woman	  standing	  alone,	  and	  one	  version	  showed	  the	  woman	  standing	  with	  an	  accomplice.	  One	  half	  of	  the	  participants	  viewed	  the	  storybook	  the	  depicted	  the	  thief	  standing	  with	  an	  accomplice,	  and	  the	  other	  half	  viewed	  the	  storybook	  the	  depicted	  the	  thief	  standing	  alone.	  Subsequent	  to	  seeing	  the	  storybook,	  each	  participant	  individually	  filled	  out	  a	  questionnaire	  that	  asked	  “true”	  or	  “false”	  questions	  about	  the	  event,	  including	  a	  question	  that	  asked	  participants	  to	  report	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  an	  accomplice	  present.	  Participants	  were	  then	  paired,	  one	  participant	  from	  the	  accomplice	  condition	  and	  the	  other	  from	  the	  no-­‐accomplice	  condition,	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  describe	  the	  event	  as	  if	  they	  were	  reporting	  the	  theft	  to	  a	  police	  officer.	  In	  their	  report,	  participants	  discussed	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  woman	  who	  was	  standing	  at	  the	  entrance	  of	  the	  bar	  was	  alone.	  Last,	  each	  participant	  individually	  filled	  out	  the	  same	  questionnaire	  that	  he	  or	  she	  filled	  out	  prior	  to	  discussion.	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   The	  results	  from	  this	  study	  indicate	  that	  39	  out	  of	  40	  participants	  correctly	  reported	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  accomplice	  was	  present	  before	  discussing	  the	  event	  with	  their	  partner,	  meaning	  that	  19	  out	  of	  20	  pairs	  were	  originally	  accurate	  in	  their	  reports	  (Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice,	  2000).	  However,	  subsequent	  to	  discussion,	  15	  out	  of	  19	  pairs	  (79%)	  ultimately	  came	  to	  an	  agreement	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  was	  an	  accomplice	  present.	  Notably,	  the	  partner	  who	  was	  less	  confident	  in	  his	  or	  her	  recollection	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  partner	  who	  was	  more	  confident	  in	  his	  or	  her	  assertion	  regarding	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  accomplice.	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  study	  demonstrates	  not	  only	  that	  false	  memories	  can	  be	  implanted	  using	  misinformation,	  but	  also	  how	  subtle	  manipulations	  and	  well-­‐intentioned	  discussion	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  incorrect	  memory	  that,	  in	  a	  legal	  context,	  can	  have	  profound	  implications.	  	  	   Wright	  et	  al.’s	  (2000)	  study	  is	  one	  among	  many	  studies	  that	  demonstrate	  how	  post-­‐event	  information	  can	  contaminate	  eyewitness	  memory.	  Post-­‐event	  information	  (PEI)	  refers	  to	  information	  that	  is	  provided	  about	  an	  event	  after	  the	  event	  occurs.	  According	  to	  Wright	  and	  Davies	  (1999,	  as	  cited	  by	  Patterson	  &	  Kemp,	  2006a)	  there	  are	  three	  primary	  ways	  in	  which	  an	  eyewitness	  can	  encounter	  PEI:	  (1)	  media	  reports	  (2)	  “being	  asked	  questions	  about	  the	  event	  by	  police	  officers,	  lawyers,	  friends	  or	  others,”	  (p.	  1083)	  and	  (3)	  co-­‐witness	  information.	  	  	   PEI	  can	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  manipulating	  eyewitness	  memory	  and	  researchers	  have	  also	  found	  that	  even	  brief	  exposure	  to	  misinformation	  can	  have	  lasting,	  long-­‐term	  effects	  on	  eyewitness	  memory	  (Zhu	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  In	  a	  study	  designed	  to	  examine	  the	  longevity	  of	  false-­‐memories,	  Zhu	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  false	  memories	  were	  still	  evident	  a	  year	  and	  half	  after	  exposure	  to	  misinformation	  and	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the	  initial	  formation	  of	  false	  memories.	  	  In	  their	  study,	  Zhu	  et	  al.	  showed	  participants	  a	  series	  of	  slides	  depicting	  two	  separate	  crimes,	  presented	  a	  narrative	  containing	  misinformation,	  and	  administered	  a	  memory	  test	  in	  which	  participants	  reported	  true	  and	  false	  memories.	  A	  year	  and	  a	  half	  later,	  researchers	  administered	  the	  memory	  test	  again.	  The	  results	  from	  this	  longitudinal	  design	  were	  profound:	  researchers	  found	  that	  although	  only	  briefly	  exposed	  to	  pieces	  of	  misinformation,	  participants	  retained	  half	  of	  the	  false	  memories	  reported	  at	  time	  1,	  which	  was	  the	  same	  rate	  of	  retention	  for	  true	  memories.	  Thus,	  participants	  were	  equally	  as	  likely	  to	  retain	  and	  subsequently	  report	  false	  memories	  as	  they	  were	  to	  retain	  and	  report	  true	  memories,	  even	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  after	  the	  exposure	  to	  misinformation.	  Evidently,	  the	  effects	  of	  misinformation	  on	  eyewitness	  memory	  can	  persist	  long	  after	  the	  eyewitness’	  initial	  exposure	  to	  misinformation.	  
Memory	  Conformity	  	   Memory	  conformity,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  social	  contagion	  of	  memory,	  refers	  to	  instances	  when	  what	  one	  person	  says	  about	  an	  event	  influences	  another	  person’s	  memory	  and	  subsequent	  report	  of	  that	  event	  (Wright,	  Mathews,	  &	  Skagerberg,	  2005).	  Memory	  conformity	  contaminates	  eyewitness	  memory	  by	  impairing,	  if	  not	  altogether	  removing,	  an	  eyewitness’	  ability	  to	  recall	  his	  or	  her	  original	  memory	  of	  an	  event	  (Douglass	  &	  Bustamante,	  2012).	  	  	   The	  legal	  implications	  of	  memory	  conformity	  are	  profound.	  When	  multiple	  eyewitnesses	  report	  similar	  accounts	  of	  an	  event,	  the	  accounts	  are	  increasingly	  corroborative	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  lawyers,	  judges,	  and	  other	  law	  enforcement	  officers	  (Hope,	  Ost,	  Gabbert,	  Healey,	  &	  Lenton,	  2008).	  After	  all,	  how	  could	  two	  or	  more	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people	  come	  to	  report	  the	  same	  version	  of	  an	  event	  that	  didn’t	  occur?	  Garrett	  (2011)	  asserts	  that	  prosecutors	  mobilize	  this	  form	  of	  “logic”	  when	  cases	  involve	  multiple	  eyewitnesses,	  and	  that	  similarities	  between	  eyewitness	  accounts	  have	  been	  used	  as	  evidence	  to	  “strengthen”	  cases	  that	  have	  ultimately	  led	  to	  wrongful	  convictions.	  For	  example,	  Cody	  Davis	  was	  wrongfully	  convicted	  of	  armed	  robbery	  after	  being	  identified	  by	  two	  witnesses	  (The	  Innocence	  Project,	  2012;	  Garrett,	  2011).	  At	  trial,	  the	  prosecutor	  for	  Davis’	  case	  argued,	  “…in	  this	  case	  you	  have	  two	  witnesses,	  again,	  that	  made	  the	  identification	  of	  Cody	  Davis,	  the	  defendant,	  on	  their	  own,	  in	  separate	  locations,	  at	  separate	  times”	  (Garrett,	  2011,	  p.	  50).	  Research	  indicates	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  influences	  can	  cause	  people	  to	  develop	  shared	  memories	  for	  events	  that	  did	  not	  occur;	  still,	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  community	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  matching	  co-­‐witness	  identifications	  corroborate	  guilt	  (Douglass	  &	  Bustamante,	  2012).	  In	  his	  assessment	  of	  exoneration	  cases,	  Garrett	  (2011)	  reports	  that	  36%	  of	  wrongfully	  convicted	  people	  were	  identified	  by	  multiple	  eyewitnesses.	  	  	   Researchers	  have	  examined	  the	  incidence	  of	  co-­‐witness	  discussion	  in	  attempt	  to	  explore	  how	  frequently	  eyewitnesses	  are	  at	  risk	  for	  memory	  conformity.	  Co-­‐witness	  discussion	  is	  one	  of	  three	  primary	  sources	  of	  PEI	  that	  can	  contaminate	  an	  eyewitness’	  memory	  (Wright	  &	  Davies,	  1999	  as	  cited	  by	  Patterson	  &	  Kemp,	  2006a).	  For	  example,	  Patterson	  and	  Kemp	  (2006b)	  surveyed	  773	  undergraduate	  students	  and	  found	  that	  75%	  of	  participants	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  witnessed	  at	  least	  one	  serious	  crime	  in	  their	  lifetime.	  Of	  the	  75%	  of	  participants	  who	  witnessed	  a	  serious	  crime,	  86%	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐witness	  present	  at	  the	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event.	  The	  majority	  (86%)	  of	  participants	  who	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  one	  or	  more	  co-­‐witness	  present	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  event	  also	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  discussed	  the	  event	  with	  a	  co-­‐witness.	  	  	   Though	  Paterson	  and	  Kemp	  (2006b)	  provide	  compelling	  data	  about	  the	  incidence	  of	  co-­‐witness	  discussion,	  they	  relied	  on	  retrospective	  recall,	  which	  must	  be	  noted	  as	  a	  methodological	  weakness.	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  (2008b)	  conducted	  a	  study	  that	  was	  similar	  to	  Paterson	  and	  Kemp’s	  study,	  but	  that	  used	  a	  smaller	  sample	  and	  most	  importantly,	  recruited	  participants	  directly	  from	  a	  group	  of	  eyewitnesses	  who	  were	  attempting	  to	  identify	  criminals	  in	  an	  ongoing,	  real	  life	  case.	  The	  latter	  design	  component	  indicates	  that	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright’s	  (2008b)	  study	  has	  two	  particular	  strengths	  that	  were	  absent	  from	  Patterson	  and	  Kemp’s	  (2006b)	  study	  of	  co-­‐witness	  discussion.	  First,	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  recruited	  eyewitnesses	  who	  were	  attempting	  to	  identify	  criminals	  in	  real	  crimes;	  second,	  researchers	  were	  able	  to	  question	  participants	  about	  experiences	  that	  they,	  as	  eyewitnesses,	  were	  having	  in	  the	  present	  moment.	  	  Together	  these	  two	  design	  components	  suggest	  that	  the	  results	  from	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright’s	  study	  –	  which	  will	  be	  subsequently	  discussed	  –	  are	  particularly	  informative,	  reliable,	  and	  ecologically	  valid.	  	  	   	  	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  (2008a)	  found	  that	  88%	  of	  the	  eyewitnesses	  in	  their	  sample	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐witness	  present	  at	  the	  event	  they	  had	  witnessed,	  and	  that	  the	  average	  number	  of	  co-­‐witnesses	  to	  an	  event	  was	  four	  people.	  Researchers	  found	  that	  of	  the	  88%	  of	  participants	  who	  reported	  being	  one	  of	  multiple	  witnesses	  to	  an	  event,	  56%	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  discussed	  the	  event	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with	  at	  least	  one	  other	  co-­‐witness.	  The	  two	  most	  common	  topics	  of	  co-­‐witness	  discussion	  were	  “general	  crime	  details”	  (52%)	  and	  “suspect	  details”	  (39%)	  (p.	  517).	  	  Evidently,	  co-­‐witness	  discussion	  is	  common	  in	  real-­‐life	  cases	  and,	  due	  to	  the	  link	  between	  co-­‐witness	  discussion	  and	  memory	  conformity,	  is	  also	  a	  cause	  for	  concern	  (Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2008a).	  	  	   Yet,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  indicate	  that	  co-­‐witness	  interaction	  is	  not	  always	  bad;	  in	  fact,	  co-­‐witness	  interaction	  can	  have	  unique	  benefits.	  For	  example,	  co-­‐witnesses	  who	  discuss	  an	  event	  may	  do	  so	  to	  provide	  emotional	  support	  for	  one	  another	  after	  enduring	  a	  traumatic	  event	  (Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2008a).	  Instead,	  the	  problem	  with	  co-­‐witness	  interaction	  occurs	  when	  one	  co-­‐witness’	  report	  contains	  inaccurate	  information,	  or	  when	  one	  co-­‐witness’	  report	  affects	  his	  or	  her	  co-­‐witness’	  confidence	  (Luus	  &	  Wells,	  1994).	  For	  example,	  Luus	  and	  Wells	  (1994)	  found	  that	  co-­‐witness	  discussion	  poses	  the	  risk	  of	  artificially	  inflating	  co-­‐witness	  confidence.	  In	  Luus	  and	  Wells’	  (1994)	  study,	  pairs	  of	  participants	  viewed	  a	  staged	  theft;	  were	  separated	  and	  asked	  to	  individually	  identify	  the	  “thief”	  from	  a	  target	  absent	  photospread;	  and	  were	  subsequently	  provided	  one	  type	  of	  feedback	  (out	  of	  nine	  possible	  types).	  Researchers	  found	  that	  participants	  who	  were	  told	  that	  they	  had	  identified	  the	  same	  suspect	  as	  their	  co-­‐witness	  were	  significantly	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  identifications	  than	  were	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  given	  any	  feedback	  about	  their	  identification.	  Conversely,	  participants	  who	  were	  told	  that	  they	  made	  a	  different	  identification	  than	  their	  co-­‐witness	  were	  significantly	  less	  confident	  than	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  given	  any	  feedback	  about	  their	  identification.	  The	  data	  from	  Luus	  and	  Wells’	  (1994)	  study	  demonstrates	  that	  co-­‐eyewitness	  confidence	  in	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malleable	  in	  both	  directions,	  regardless	  of	  accuracy.	  Manipulating	  eyewitness	  confidence	  is	  problematic	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  trial,	  jurors	  tend	  to	  perceive	  confident	  eyewitnesses	  as	  more	  credible	  (Whitley	  &	  Greenburg,	  1986),	  despite	  a	  weak	  relationship	  between	  eyewitness	  confidence	  and	  accuracy	  (Luus	  &	  Wells,	  1994).	  Indeed,	  co-­‐witness	  interaction	  has	  both	  detrimental	  and	  beneficial	  effects;	  yet,	  the	  profound	  consequences	  that	  can	  stem	  from	  the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  co-­‐witness	  interaction	  requires	  an	  investigation	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  co-­‐witnesses	  come	  to	  share	  inaccurate	  memories.	  	  
Evidence	  of	  Co-­‐Witness	  Memory	  Conformity	  	  	   The	  current	  body	  of	  research	  on	  memory	  conformity	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  influence	  susceptibility	  to	  memory	  conformity.	  Some	  factors	  include:	  response	  order	  (Wright,	  Mathews,	  &	  Skagerberg,	  2005;	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009);	  perceived	  encoding	  duration	  (Gabbert,	  Memon,	  &	  Wright,	  2007);	  power	  differentials	  between	  co-­‐witnesses	  (Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2008b),	  perceptions	  of	  co-­‐witness	  confidence	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009;	  Wright	  &	  Villabla,	  2012),	  and	  co-­‐witness	  relationship	  type	  	  (e.g.,	  romantic	  couples,	  platonic	  friendships,	  strangers)	  (French,	  Garry,	  &	  Mori,	  2008;	  Hope	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  These	  factors	  and	  their	  implications	  will	  be	  subsequently	  discussed.	  	   In	  2005,	  Wright	  et	  al.	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  designed	  to	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  response	  order	  on	  participants’	  recollections	  of	  previously	  seen	  and	  previously	  unseen	  items.	  	  In	  this	  set	  of	  studies,	  participants	  viewed	  a	  set	  of	  stimuli	  (either	  faces,	  words,	  or	  cars)	  and	  then	  were	  given	  a	  recognition	  memory	  test	  that	  contained	  both	  previously	  seen	  and	  unseen	  stimuli.	  Participants	  were	  paired	  with	  a	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confederate	  and	  asked	  to	  verbally	  indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  seen	  each	  stimulus	  before.	  The	  pairs	  were	  instructed	  to	  take	  turns	  responding,	  though	  the	  conditions	  were	  manipulated	  such	  that	  the	  confederate	  responded	  first.	  Confederates	  provided	  wrong	  answers	  for	  a	  third	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  The	  results	  from	  each	  study	  demonstrate	  that	  participants	  conformed	  to	  the	  confederate’s	  incorrect	  responses	  for	  previously	  seen	  and	  unseen	  stimuli.	  However,	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  confederate’s	  bogus	  response	  for	  items	  that	  the	  participant	  had	  not	  seen,	  than	  they	  were	  to	  conform	  to	  incorrect	  responses	  for	  items	  that	  they	  had	  seen.	  This	  finding	  appears	  to	  have	  two	  implications.	  	  	   First,	  the	  findings	  suggests	  that	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  a	  false	  memory	  for	  a	  non-­‐existing	  event	  than	  they	  are	  to	  not	  report	  a	  memory	  for	  an	  actual	  event	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2005);	  however,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  	  In	  an	  earlier	  study	  Wright	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  found	  that	  participants	  were	  equally	  as	  likely	  to	  develop	  a	  false	  memory	  that	  an	  accomplice	  was	  present	  when	  in	  fact	  there	  was	  none,	  as	  they	  were	  to	  develop	  a	  false	  memory	  that	  an	  accomplice	  was	  not	  present	  when	  in	  fact	  she	  was.	  Thus,	  the	  existing	  data	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  a	  false	  memory	  for	  a	  non-­‐existing	  event	  than	  they	  are	  to	  not	  report	  a	  memory	  for	  an	  actual	  event	  leaves	  this	  topic	  open	  for	  debate.	  Memory	  conformity	  is	  a	  complex	  social	  phenomenon	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  moderating	  variables	  exist	  and	  affect	  this	  relationship	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  currently	  unclear.	  	  	   Second,	  the	  results	  from	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  study	  provides	  evidence	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  people	  trust	  other	  people’s	  memories	  more	  when	  they	  lack	  their	  own	  memory	  for	  a	  particular	  item	  or	  event.	  Gabbert	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  posited	  a	  similar	  
SOCIAL	  ANXIETY	  AND	  MEMORY	  CONFORMITY	   15	  
argument	  after	  conducting	  a	  study	  to	  determine	  the	  effects	  of	  perceived	  encoding	  duration	  differentials	  on	  memory	  conformity	  in	  co-­‐witnesses.	  In	  Gabbert	  et	  al.’s	  (2007)	  study,	  previously	  unacquainted	  pairs	  of	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  be	  viewing	  a	  series	  of	  photos,	  and	  that	  one	  participant	  would	  be	  viewing	  photos	  for	  half	  as	  long	  as	  the	  other,	  while	  the	  other	  participant	  would	  be	  viewing	  the	  photos	  for	  twice	  as	  long	  as	  the	  other;	  though	  participants	  actually	  viewed	  the	  photos	  for	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  time.	  Participants	  were	  then	  shown	  four	  photos	  of	  complex	  scenes	  containing	  various	  objects,	  and	  although	  they	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  would	  be	  viewing	  the	  same	  photos,	  they	  were	  shown	  two	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  complex	  scenes.	  Overall,	  there	  were	  8	  “critical	  items”	  that	  differed	  between	  versions	  	  (e.g.,	  version	  (a)	  “woman	  holding	  a	  cigarette,”	  version	  (b)	  “woman	  holding	  a	  glass	  of	  red	  wine”)	  (Gabbert	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  322).	  After	  looking	  at	  the	  photos,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  work	  together	  to	  recall	  the	  details	  of	  the	  photos	  and	  were	  not	  required	  to	  take	  turns	  speaking.	  Subsequently,	  participants	  individually	  completed	  a	  free-­‐recall	  task	  that	  required	  participants	  to	  only	  report	  seen	  items.	  	  	   Results	  from	  this	  study	  demonstrate	  that	  overall,	  359	  critical	  items	  were	  mentioned	  in	  co-­‐witnesses’	  discussion	  and	  that	  102	  of	  the	  critical	  items	  were	  later	  incorrectly	  reported	  in	  the	  free-­‐recall	  task	  (Gabbert	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Therefore,	  memory	  conformity	  occurred	  in	  both	  conditions:	  those	  who	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  saw	  photos	  for	  twice	  as	  long	  as	  their	  partner	  conformed,	  as	  did	  those	  who	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  saw	  photos	  for	  half	  as	  long	  as	  their	  partner.	  Further	  evaluation	  of	  the	  data	  demonstrates	  that	  on	  average,	  the	  participants	  who	  believed	  that	  they	  viewed	  photos	  for	  half	  as	  long	  reported	  more	  errant	  critical	  items	  when	  compared	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to	  their	  partners,	  who	  believed	  that	  they	  had	  viewed	  photos	  for	  twice	  as	  long.	  Therefore,	  the	  mere	  perception	  of	  differences	  in	  encoding	  duration	  makes	  an	  individual	  more	  susceptible	  to	  memory	  conformity:	  eyewitnesses	  who	  perceive	  their	  memory	  to	  be	  inferior	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  co-­‐witness’s	  memory,	  even	  when	  their	  co-­‐witness’s	  memories	  are	  invalid	  or	  differ	  from	  their	  own.	  	  	  	   It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  data	  from	  Gabbert	  et	  al.’s	  (2007)	  study	  revealed	  a	  response	  order	  effect:	  the	  partner	  who	  did	  not	  initially	  mention	  a	  critical	  item	  during	  co-­‐witness	  discussions	  was	  12	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  influenced	  in	  the	  free	  recall	  task.	  This	  finding	  is	  consistent	  with	  those	  from	  other	  studies	  in	  which	  researchers	  have	  found	  an	  effect	  of	  response	  order	  on	  memory	  conformity	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009).	  For	  example,	  in	  their	  study	  of	  memory	  conformity	  among	  mock	  co-­‐witnesses,	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  (2000)	  found	  that	  11	  out	  of	  the	  15	  pairs	  who	  conformed	  in	  their	  reports	  of	  event	  details	  (i.e.,	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  an	  accomplice)	  conformed	  “in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  person	  with	  higher	  confidence.”	  (p.	  197).	  The	  emerging	  pattern	  of	  results	  that	  shows	  that	  co-­‐witnesses	  tend	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  more	  confident	  witness	  is	  concerning	  due	  to	  evidence	  that	  eyewitness	  confidence	  is	  not	  a	  reliable	  measure	  of	  accuracy	  (Wells,	  Olson,	  &	  Charman,	  2002).	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  co-­‐witness	  confidence,	  researchers	  have	  also	  found	  that	  power	  differentials	  among	  co-­‐witnesses	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  memory	  conformity	  (Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2008b).	  In	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright’s	  (2008b)	  study,	  pairs	  of	  participants	  viewed	  50	  faces	  and	  then	  completed	  a	  “power	  task”	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  set	  up	  a	  power	  differential	  between	  the	  members	  of	  each	  pair.	  This	  task	  required	  one	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participant	  to	  design	  a	  restaurant	  in	  5	  minutes	  (low	  power),	  and	  the	  other	  participant	  to	  assess	  the	  design	  as	  the	  “judge”	  (high	  power).	  After	  manipulating	  the	  power	  differential,	  participants	  were	  shown	  a	  set	  of	  100	  faces	  and	  asked	  to	  rate	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  seen	  the	  face	  before.	  Low-­‐power	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  high-­‐power	  participants	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  their	  partner’s	  memory	  report.	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  suggest	  that	  the	  tendency	  for	  people	  to	  seek	  social	  approval	  may	  lead	  low-­‐power	  individuals	  to	  accept	  a	  response	  as	  correct	  simply	  because	  they	  perceive	  their	  partner	  as	  being	  more	  powerful.	  In	  cases	  that	  involve	  multiple	  witnesses,	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  witness	  who	  is	  perceived	  as	  most	  powerful	  to	  influence	  his	  or	  her	  co-­‐witness’	  memory.	  	  	   In	  a	  subsequent	  study,	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  (2009)	  built	  on	  their	  previous	  findings	  to	  determine	  how	  power	  differentials	  among	  pairs	  of	  siblings	  would	  influence	  memory	  conformity.	  Researchers	  hypothesized	  that	  older	  siblings	  would	  influence	  younger	  siblings’	  memory	  reports	  during	  a	  facial	  recognition	  task;	  however,	  their	  results	  did	  not	  support	  this	  hypothesis.	  Instead,	  researchers	  found	  that	  response	  order	  affected	  memory	  conformity:	  what	  the	  first	  person	  reported	  affected	  how	  the	  second	  person	  answered.	  Interestingly,	  researchers	  also	  found	  that	  rates	  of	  memory	  conformity	  were	  higher	  when	  participants	  perceived	  their	  sibling	  as	  being	  highly	  confident	  (Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009).	  Skagerberg	  and	  Wright	  suggest	  that	  that	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  sibling	  relationships	  –	  something	  that	  was	  unaccounted	  for	  in	  their	  study	  –	  may	  have	  affected	  the	  hypothesized	  relationship	  between	  power	  and	  memory	  conformity	  in	  their	  sample.	  Future	  studies	  that	  control	  for	  various	  components	  of	  a	  sibling	  relationship	  (e.g.,	  closeness,	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agreeableness,	  age	  gap,	  etc.)	  may	  provide	  better	  insight	  into	  the	  effect	  of	  sibling	  power	  differentials	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  	   Other	  researchers	  have	  used	  pairs	  of	  strangers	  and	  romantic	  couples	  to	  study	  the	  effects	  of	  relationship	  type	  on	  memory	  conformity	  (French,	  Garry,	  &	  Mori,	  2008).	  In	  French	  et	  al.’s	  (2008)	  study,	  pairs	  of	  strangers	  and	  romantic	  couples	  watched	  a	  movie	  of	  a	  crime	  and	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  were	  viewing	  the	  exact	  same	  event;	  however,	  they	  actually	  saw	  two	  different	  versions	  of	  the	  event.	  After,	  participants	  completed	  two	  tasks:	  first,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  engage	  in	  discussion	  about	  the	  “event”	  and	  to	  answer	  a	  set	  of	  questions.	  Second,	  participants	  completed	  independent	  recognition	  tasks	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  test	  memory	  accuracy	  for	  their	  respective	  movie	  version.	  Researchers	  found	  that	  during	  discussion,	  couples	  and	  pairs	  of	  strangers	  were	  equally	  as	  likely	  to	  expose	  each	  other	  to	  misinformation,	  and,	  that	  they	  were	  equally	  likely	  to	  dispute	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  misinformation.	  However,	  results	  from	  the	  independent	  memory	  tests	  indicate	  that	  romantic	  partners	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  pairs	  of	  strangers	  to	  incorporate	  misinformation	  into	  their	  memories	  (French	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  When	  compared	  to	  pairs	  of	  strangers,	  romantic	  couples	  were	  also	  more	  confident	  in	  both	  their	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  memory	  reports.	  This	  finding	  suggests	  that	  members	  of	  a	  romantic	  couple	  perceive	  each	  other	  as	  being	  accurate	  and	  reliable.	  It	  is	  also	  likely	  that	  couples	  are	  used	  to	  relying	  on	  each	  other’s	  memories	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life,	  where	  the	  consequences	  of	  memory	  conformity	  may	  go	  unnoticed	  or	  be	  misattributed.	  	  	  	   In	  an	  experiment	  with	  a	  similar	  purpose	  to	  French	  et	  al.’s	  (2008)	  study,	  but	  that	  had	  a	  slightly	  different	  design,	  Hope	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  evaluated	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐
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witness	  relationship	  type	  (strangers,	  friends,	  or	  romantic	  partners)	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  Hope	  et	  al.’s	  study,	  co-­‐witnesses	  watched	  an	  event	  from	  different	  perspectives	  but	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  had	  viewed	  the	  event	  from	  the	  same	  perspective.	  Pairs	  subsequently	  discussed	  the	  events	  with	  their	  co-­‐witness	  and	  then	  engaged	  in	  an	  individual	  cued-­‐recall	  task.	  Results	  revealed	  that	  all	  dyads	  incorporated	  co-­‐witness	  misinformation	  into	  their	  individual	  recollections,	  but	  that	  the	  effect	  was	  stronger	  for	  friends	  and	  couples.	  Co-­‐witnesses	  who	  were	  previously	  acquainted	  (friends	  and	  couples)	  incorporated	  significantly	  more	  misinformation	  into	  their	  individual	  recollections	  when	  compared	  to	  strangers	  who	  had	  not	  been	  previously	  acquainted.	  Another	  interesting	  finding	  to	  emerge	  from	  this	  study	  is	  that	  among	  pairs	  of	  strangers,	  the	  individuals	  who	  incorporated	  the	  most	  misinformation	  rated	  their	  co-­‐witness	  as	  being	  more	  likeable	  than	  those	  who	  incorporated	  less	  misinformation.	  Together	  these	  findings	  indicate	  that	  an	  individual’s	  relationship	  with,	  and	  perception	  of,	  their	  co-­‐witness	  can	  profoundly	  impact	  witness’s	  individual	  memory	  reports.	  	  
	   Evidently,	  there	  are	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  factors	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  memory	  conformity	  and	  that	  can	  cause	  an	  inaccurate	  eyewitness	  to	  feel	  more	  confident	  in	  his	  or	  her	  memory	  performance.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  individual	  differences	  further	  complicate	  the	  relationship	  between	  memory	  conformity	  and	  the	  social	  factors	  discussed	  thus	  far.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  myriad	  of	  dispositional	  variables	  influence	  decision-­‐making,	  it	  is	  disquieting	  that	  researchers	  have	  paid	  such	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  effects	  that	  individual	  differences	  have	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  the	  following	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section,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  eyewitness	  anxiety	  through	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  scant	  existing	  literature	  on	  eyewitness	  anxiety	  and	  eyewitness	  memory	  performance.	  	  
Eyewitness	  Anxiety	  	  
	   An	  eyewitness	  may	  find	  his	  or	  herself	  experiencing	  anxiety	  for	  a	  host	  of	  different	  reasons.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  the	  numerous	  ways	  in	  which	  criminal	  events,	  police	  procedures,	  and	  legal	  situations	  can	  provoke	  anxiety.	  	  Yet,	  this	  factor	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  the	  context	  of	  eyewitness	  memory	  performance.	  However,	  within	  the	  existing	  literature,	  there	  are	  emerging	  relationships	  between	  eyewitness	  performance	  and	  anxiety	  that	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  an	  area	  of	  research	  worth	  exploring.	  	   In	  a	  clever	  study	  conducted	  by	  Valentine	  and	  Mesout	  (2009),	  researchers	  investigated	  whether	  or	  not	  state	  anxiety	  would	  impact	  participants’	  abilities	  to	  describe	  and	  identify	  someone	  who	  they	  had	  encountered	  in	  the	  “Horror	  Labyrinth”.	  The	  Horror	  Labyrinth,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  exhibit	  in	  the	  tour	  of	  the	  London	  Dungeon,	  is	  a	  maze	  comprised	  of	  mirrored	  walls	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  “disorient”	  its	  visitors	  (Valentine	  &	  Mesout,	  2009,	  p.	  154).	  In	  the	  maze	  there	  is	  also	  a	  “scary	  person”	  whose	  job	  is	  to	  jump	  out	  at	  visitors.	  In	  this	  study,	  participants	  walked	  through	  the	  Labyrinth	  for	  7	  minutes	  where	  they	  at	  some	  point	  encountered	  the	  “scary	  person”.	  45	  minutes	  after	  leaving	  the	  maze,	  participants	  completed	  a	  state-­‐anxiety	  questionnaire,	  provided	  a	  written	  description	  of	  the	  “scary	  person,”	  and	  answered	  questions	  about	  the	  “scary	  person”	  in	  a	  cued-­‐recall	  memory	  task.	  Last,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  identify	  the	  ‘scary	  person’	  from	  a	  target	  present	  lineup	  and	  then	  rate	  their	  level	  of	  confidence	  in	  their	  identification	  accuracy.	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   The	  data	  from	  this	  study	  reveal	  4	  key	  findings.	  When	  compared	  to	  participants	  who	  reported	  low	  state	  anxiety,	  participants	  who	  reported	  higher	  state	  anxiety:	  (1)	  recalled	  fewer	  correct	  details	  about	  the	  “scary	  person”,	  	  (2)	  reported	  more	  incorrect	  details	  about	  the	  “scary	  person”,	  and	  (3)	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  make	  a	  correct	  identification	  in	  the	  photospread	  task.	  The	  fourth	  key	  finding	  from	  this	  study	  is	  particularly	  alarming:	  among	  the	  participants	  who	  fell	  above	  the	  median	  score	  on	  the	  state	  anxiety	  scale	  (high	  anxiety),	  only	  17%	  made	  a	  correct	  identification.	  This	  finding	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  75%	  of	  correct	  identifications	  made	  by	  participants	  who	  scored	  below	  the	  median	  score	  on	  the	  state	  anxiety	  scale	  (low	  anxiety)	  (Valentine	  &	  Mesout,	  2009).	  Together	  these	  findings	  demonstrate	  that	  within	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time	  after	  the	  event,	  a	  witness’	  identification	  accuracy	  may	  be	  severely	  diminished	  by	  state	  anxiety	  that	  is	  high	  during	  the	  event.	  	  	   Another	  noteworthy	  finding	  from	  this	  study	  is	  that	  a	  gendered	  pattern	  of	  results	  emerged:	  overall,	  women	  reported	  higher	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  when	  compared	  to	  men	  (Valentine	  &	  Mesout,	  2009).	  Women	  also	  made	  significantly	  fewer	  correct	  identifications	  from	  the	  target-­‐present	  lineup	  than	  men	  did.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  female	  witnesses	  may	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  state	  anxiety	  on	  identification	  accuracy	  than	  male	  witnesses.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  experiencing	  anxiety	  during	  and	  soon	  after	  an	  event,	  a	  witness	  may	  find	  his	  or	  herself	  experiencing	  anxiety	  during	  the	  identification	  procedure	  itself.	  Test	  anxiety,	  according	  to	  Nolan	  and	  Markham	  (1998)	  refers	  to	  an	  individual’s	  tendency	  to	  reflect	  “a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  her/his	  abilities”	  and	  to	  experience	  “a	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  possible	  negative	  outcomes”	  (p.	  45).	  Not	  surprisingly,	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those	  who	  score	  high	  in	  test	  anxiety	  also	  report	  having	  less	  confidence	  in	  performance	  situations.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  a	  witness	  to	  experience	  test	  anxiety	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  level	  of	  task	  importance	  is	  elevated	  and	  that	  the	  task	  is	  likely	  unfamiliar;	  in	  a	  1998	  study,	  Nolan	  and	  Markham	  investigated	  this	  notion.	  	  	   Nolan	  and	  Markham	  (1998)	  sought	  to	  determine	  if	  test	  anxiety	  moderated	  the	  relationship	  between	  accuracy	  and	  confidence.	  Participants	  in	  this	  study	  viewed	  a	  crime	  and	  a	  week	  later,	  were	  asked	  to	  answer	  a	  set	  of	  questions	  about	  the	  event	  and	  to	  rate	  their	  confidence	  in	  each	  answer.	  Additionally,	  participants	  completed	  a	  questionnaire	  designed	  to	  measure	  test	  anxiety	  that,	  based	  on	  their	  scores,	  researchers	  used	  to	  split	  participants	  into	  low	  and	  high	  anxiety	  groups.	  Researchers	  found	  that	  participants	  who	  were	  highly	  anxious	  expressed	  significantly	  less	  confidence	  in	  the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  answers	  overall,	  than	  did	  participants	  who	  were	  less	  anxious.	  Further	  analysis	  demonstrated	  that	  highly	  anxious	  participants	  were	  significantly	  less	  confident	  in	  answers	  that	  were	  correct,	  than	  were	  participants	  who	  were	  less	  anxious.	  However,	  participants	  in	  the	  high	  and	  low	  anxiety	  groups	  expressed	  comparable	  levels	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  answers	  that	  were	  incorrect.	  Although	  more	  evidence	  is	  needed,	  results	  from	  this	  study	  do	  provide	  some	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  test	  anxiety	  may	  moderate	  the	  accuracy-­‐confidence	  relationship	  among	  eyewitnesses.	  	  	   One	  additional	  and	  noteworthy	  piece	  of	  information	  from	  this	  study	  is	  that	  during	  their	  experiment,	  Nolan	  and	  Markham	  (1998)	  sat	  participants	  so	  that	  they	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  screen	  that	  projected	  a	  live	  video	  feed	  of	  the	  session.	  This	  design	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component	  was	  intended	  to	  increase	  participants’	  feelings	  of	  anxiety	  and	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  is	  noteworthy	  because	  it	  suggests	  that	  self-­‐awareness	  can	  be	  operationalized	  through	  visual	  feedback	  of	  the	  self	  (Nolan	  &	  Markham,	  1998).	  	   Similarly,	  other	  researchers	  have	  found	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  live	  video	  feed,	  mirrors	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  operationalize	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  (Carver	  &	  Scheier,	  1997).	  In	  a	  series	  of	  four	  studies,	  Carver	  and	  Scheier	  examined	  the	  effects	  of	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  on	  an	  individual’s	  transient	  affective	  state	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  effects	  of	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  would	  vary	  as	  a	  function	  of	  valence	  (Carver	  &	  Scheier,	  1997).	  In	  Carver	  and	  Scheier’s	  studies,	  participants	  were	  either	  faced	  with	  a	  mirror	  or	  not	  faced	  with	  a	  mirror	  while	  either	  a	  positive	  (e.g.,	  attraction)	  or	  negative	  (e.g.,	  depression)	  emotion	  was	  made	  salient.	  Researchers	  found	  that	  when	  a	  mirror	  was	  present,	  participants	  provided	  higher	  intensity	  ratings	  of	  the	  manipulated	  emotion	  in	  question,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  emotion	  was	  positive	  of	  negative.	  	  Carver	  and	  Scheier	  (1997)	  suggest	  that	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  mirror,	  participants	  were	  cued	  to	  shift	  their	  attention	  towards	  themselves	  and	  consequently,	  to	  become	  more	  cognizant	  of	  their	  “transient	  affective	  state”	  (p.	  625).	  	  Thus,	  Carver	  and	  Scheier	  conclude	  that	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  a	  mirror	  can	  be	  used	  to	  manipulate	  self	  focus,	  thereby	  providing	  additional	  evidence	  to	  validate	  mirrors	  as	  a	  successful	  way	  to	  induce	  self-­‐focus	  	  (Feningstein,	  Scheier,	  &	  Buss,	  1975;	  Scheier,	  1976;	  Carver	  &	  Scheier,	  1978).	  	  	  	   At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  apt	  to	  state	  that	  many	  police	  procedure	  rooms	  contain	  one-­‐way	  mirrors.	  Based	  on	  the	  findings	  explored	  in	  this	  section,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  an	  eyewitness	  is	  experiencing	  anxiety	  during	  an	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identification	  procedure,	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  may	  increase	  anxiety	  and	  inhibit	  eyewitness	  performance.	  Experiments	  1A	  and	  1B	  determined	  if	  participants	  who	  make	  an	  identification	  from	  a	  photospread	  will	  report	  higher	  levels	  of	  state-­‐anxiety	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  when	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  make	  an	  identification	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  mirror.	  Experiment	  2	  built	  upon	  the	  results	  from	  experiments	  1A	  and	  1B.	  	   	  	  
EXPERIMENT	  1A	  
Method	  
Participants	  	   Participants	  in	  Experiment	  1A	  were	  31	  undergraduate	  psychology	  students	  (21	  women,	  7	  men,	  2	  no	  reported	  gender)	  who	  ranged	  in	  age	  from	  17	  to	  21	  (M=	  18.41,	  SD	  =	  0.88)	  years	  old.	  Participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  an	  introductory	  psychology	  class	  at	  a	  small	  liberal	  arts	  college	  and	  received	  extra	  credit	  for	  their	  participation.	  No	  restrictions	  were	  placed	  upon	  participant	  eligibility,	  and	  informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  prior	  to	  beginning	  the	  experiment.	  	  
Materials	  
Crime	  Video	  and	  Photospread	  	   In	  the	  first	  portion	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  viewed	  a	  43	  second	  video	  of	  a	  staged	  encounter.	  In	  the	  video,	  an	  individual	  returns	  to	  his	  office	  where	  he	  sees	  a	  man	  building	  a	  bomb	  on	  the	  roof	  outside	  of	  his	  window	  (Bradfield,	  Wells,	  &	  Olson,	  2002).	  Once	  the	  “bomber”	  sees	  the	  man	  looking	  out	  his	  window,	  the	  bomber	  runs	  into	  the	  building	  and	  then	  away	  down	  the	  stairs.	  In	  this	  video,	  the	  culprit	  looks	  directly	  at	  the	  camera	  when	  he	  initially	  sees	  the	  man	  looking	  out	  his	  window	  and	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also	  while	  he	  running	  away;	  therefore,	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  see	  his	  entire	  face	  for	  a	  total	  of	  3	  seconds.	  	  	   The	  target-­‐absent	  photospread	  used	  in	  this	  study	  was	  created	  by	  Bradfield	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  to	  be	  used	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  crime	  video	  described	  above.	  The	  photospread	  contains	  two	  rows	  of	  three	  colored	  photographs;	  any	  identification	  that	  participants	  make	  is	  incorrect	  (false	  positive).	  	  
One-­‐way	  Mirror	  	   Half	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  experiment	  completed	  their	  identification	  task	  and	  their	  questionnaires	  in	  front	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror,	  and	  the	  other	  half	  completed	  their	  task	  and	  measures	  when	  the	  mirror	  was	  fully	  covered	  by	  a	  non-­‐transparent	  shade.	  The	  mirror	  used	  in	  this	  experiment	  is	  located	  in	  one	  of	  the	  college’s	  psychology	  research	  labs	  and	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirrors	  that	  are	  found	  in	  police	  stations.	  	  
Confidence	  and	  Task	  Engagement	  Questionnaire,	  Profile	  of	  Mood	  States,	  State-­‐Trait	  
Anxiety	  Inventory	  	   Immediately	  after	  making	  their	  identification,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  report	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  (extremely)	  how	  confident	  they	  were	  that	  they	  “correctly	  identified	  the	  perpetrator.”	  Participants	  were	  also	  asked	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  their	  level	  of	  engagement	  in	  the	  study	  (e.g.,	  “How	  much	  did	  you	  care	  
about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  this	  study?”)	  (Baron	  et	  al.,	  1996)	  (see	  Appendix	  A).	  	  	   Participants	  subsequently	  completed	  the	  Profile	  of	  Mood	  States	  Short	  Form	  (POMS-­‐SF),	  a	  37	  item	  self-­‐report	  questionnaire	  that	  is	  designed	  to	  assess	  six	  dimensions	  of	  an	  individual’s	  mood	  state	  (see	  Appendix	  B)	  (Shacham,	  1983).	  This	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measure	  contains	  six	  subscales:	  tension-­‐anxiety,	  depression-­‐dejection,	  anger-­‐hostility,	  vigor-­‐activity,	  fatigue-­‐inertia,	  confusion-­‐bewilderment.	  This	  measure	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  a	  manipulation	  check	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  is	  a	  manipulation	  of	  anxiety	  only,	  and	  not	  of	  any	  other	  mood	  state.	  	   Last,	  participants	  completed	  the	  State-­‐Trait	  Anxiety	  Inventory	  (STAI)	  (Speilberger	  et	  al.,	  1983)	  a	  40-­‐item	  questionnaire	  designed	  to	  assess	  an	  individual’s	  state	  anxiety	  and	  trait	  anxiety	  (see	  Appendix	  C).	  The	  STAI	  has	  adequate	  discriminant	  validity	  for	  state	  and	  trait	  anxiety,	  and	  has	  also	  been	  successfully	  administered	  in	  a	  general,	  subclinical	  population	  (Metzger,	  1976;	  Ray,	  1984).	  	  
Procedure	  	   Upon	  arrival	  at	  the	  research	  lab	  and	  after	  obtaining	  informed	  consent,	  participants	  were	  seated	  at	  a	  desk	  and	  instructed	  to	  watch	  the	  crime	  video	  on	  a	  13-­‐inch	  MacBook	  Pro.	  Participants	  were	  told	  to	  start	  the	  video	  once	  the	  experimenter	  left	  the	  room	  and	  then	  to	  join	  the	  experimenter	  in	  the	  hall	  when	  the	  video	  ended.	  Thereafter,	  the	  participants	  and	  the	  experimenter	  moved	  to	  the	  adjacent	  laboratory	  room	  that	  contained	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror.	  	  	   Once	  inside	  the	  mirror	  room,	  participants	  were	  seated	  at	  a	  desk	  directly	  in	  front	  of	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror.	  In	  the	  high-­‐anxiety	  condition	  the	  mirror	  was	  exposed,	  and	  in	  the	  low-­‐anxiety	  condition,	  the	  mirror	  was	  covered	  by	  a	  closed	  shade.	  The	  examiner	  then	  provided	  participants	  with	  the	  photospread	  and	  an	  identification	  sheet,	  recited	  unbiased	  instructions	  that	  the	  culprit	  “may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  present	  in	  the	  lineup,”	  and	  informed	  participant	  that	  she	  would	  step	  outside	  while	  participants	  made	  his	  or	  her	  identification.	  After	  one	  minute,	  the	  examiner	  returned	  to	  the	  room	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to	  collect	  the	  participant’s	  identification	  materials	  and	  to	  give	  the	  packet	  of	  questionnaires	  that	  contained	  the	  confidence	  rating,	  POMS-­‐SF,	  and	  the	  STAI.	  Subsequent	  to	  completing	  the	  questionnaires,	  participants	  were	  thanked	  for	  their	  participation	  and	  debriefed	  (see	  Appendix	  D).	  	  
Results	  	   Table	  1	  lists	  the	  frequency	  of	  misidentification	  per	  lineup	  member,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  frequency	  of	  correctly	  opting	  to	  not	  make	  an	  identification,	  as	  the	  true	  culprit	  was	  not	  present	  in	  the	  lineup.	  One	  participant’s	  identification	  was	  eliminated	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  made	  two	  identifications.	  	  	   After	  making	  their	  identifications,	  using	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  (extremely)	  participants	  reported	  how	  hard	  they	  tried	  on	  the	  task,	  how	  much	  they	  cared	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response,	  and	  how	  strong	  of	  a	  desire	  they	  had	  to	  be	  above	  average	  on	  the	  task.	  A	  series	  of	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  comparing	  participant’s	  responses	  to	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  scale	  demonstrated	  that	  participants	  reported	  trying	  significantly	  harder	  on	  this	  task	  (M	  =	  4.60,	  SD	  =	  0.93),	  t(29)=	  9.40,	  p	  <	  .001,	  and	  cared	  significantly	  more	  than	  the	  midpoint	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  (M	  =	  4.6,	  SD	  =	  1.33),	  t(29)=	  6.78,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Furthermore,	  a	  series	  of	  two-­‐sample	  independent	  groups	  t-­‐tests	  demonstrates	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  tried	  equally	  as	  hard	  on	  the	  task	  as	  those	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition,	  and	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  cared	  equally	  as	  much	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  when	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  (Table	  2).	  	  	   A	  series	  of	  independent-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  revealed	  that	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition,	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  did	  not	  have	  significantly	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different	  scores	  of:	  vigor-­‐activity,	  depression-­‐dejection,	  confusion-­‐bewilderment,	  tension-­‐anxiety,	  anger-­‐hostility,	  or	  fatigue-­‐inertia	  (Table	  3).	  	  	   Scores	  from	  the	  STAI	  (Speilberger	  et	  al.,	  1983)	  indicate	  that	  the	  average	  state	  anxiety	  score	  was	  39.03	  (SD	  =	  9.31)	  and	  the	  average	  trait	  anxiety	  score	  was	  41.00	  (SD	  =	  8.20).	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  women’s	  trait	  anxiety	  scores	  (M	  =	  40.95,	  SD	  =	  8.81)	  were	  not	  significantly	  higher	  than	  men’s	  (M	  =	  38.29,	  SD	  =	  6.23),	  t(26)=-­‐1.15,	  p	  =	  .33),	  nor	  were	  women’s	  reported	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  (M	  =	  40.95,	  SD	  =	  10.32)	  significantly	  higher	  than	  men’s	  (M	  =	  34.43,	  SD	  =	  4.237)	  t(26)=	  -­‐1.16,	  p	  =	  .11.	  	  There	  were	  also	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  state	  anxiety	  scores	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  (Table	  4).	  	  	   Last,	  an	  evaluation	  of	  confidence	  scores	  demonstrates	  that	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  (extremely)	  participants	  were	  moderately	  confident	  that	  they	  had	  made	  a	  correct	  choice	  in	  the	  identification	  task	  (M	  =	  2.97,	  SD	  =	  1.45).	  A	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  comparing	  participant’s	  confidence	  scores	  to	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  scale	  indicate	  that	  participant’s	  confidence	  scores	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	  (M	  =	  2.97,	  SD	  =	  1.45),	  t(29)=	  -­‐0.12,	  p	  =	  .90.	  A	  two-­‐sample	  independent	  group	  t-­‐test	  revealed	  that	  although	  the	  difference	  in	  confidence	  scores	  among	  participants	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  (M	  =	  2.68,	  SD	  =	  1.24)	  was	  not	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  confidence	  scores	  of	  those	  who	  opted	  not	  to	  make	  an	  identification	  (M	  =	  3.71,	  SD	  =	  1.89),	  t(27)=	  1.67,	  p	  =	  .10,	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  trend.	  Last,	  a	  two-­‐sample	  independent	  groups	  t-­‐test	  demonstrates	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  confidence	  scores	  of	  those	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  3.20,	  SD	  =	  1.65)	  and	  those	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  2.73,	  SD	  =	  1.22),	  t(27)=	  0.87,	  p	  =	  .38.	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Discussion	  	  	   The	  results	  from	  Experiment	  1A	  did	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  participants	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  would	  report	  higher	  levels	  of	  state-­‐anxiety	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  when	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror.	  However	  there	  were	  two	  primary	  flaws	  in	  Experiment	  1A	  that	  likely	  contributed	  to	  these	  results.	  First,	  participants	  completed	  their	  identification	  task	  immediately	  after	  viewing	  the	  video	  which	  did	  not	  leave	  adequate	  time	  for	  participants	  to	  recognize	  and,	  potentially,	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  mirror.	  In	  addition,	  some	  participants	  appeared	  to	  be	  confused	  by	  the	  unbiased	  directions	  and	  were	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  being	  asked	  to	  make	  an	  identification.	  Therefore,	  Experiment	  1B	  was	  designed	  to	  remedy	  these	  shortcomings	  and	  determine	  if	  the	  improvements	  would	  produce	  the	  predicted	  results.	  	  
EXPERIMENT	  1B	  
Method	  
	   The	  procedures,	  materials,	  and	  analytic	  approach	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1B	  were	  the	  same	  as	  Experiment	  1A	  with	  three	  exceptions.	  First,	  subsequent	  to	  watching	  the	  crime	  video	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  identification	  task,	  participants	  were	  left	  alone	  in	  the	  mirror	  room	  for	  2.5	  minutes.	  The	  experimenter	  told	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  that	  she	  “just	  needs	  to	  gather	  some	  materials	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  mirror,	  and	  will	  be	  back	  shortly,”	  whereas	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  were	  told	  that	  the	  examiner	  “just	  needs	  to	  gather	  some	  materials	  and	  will	  be	  back	  shortly.”	  This	  change	  was	  intended	  to	  explicitly	  direct	  participant’s	  attention	  towards	  the	  mirror	  and	  to	  expose	  them	  to	  the	  mirror	  for	  a	  short	  amount	  of	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time	  before	  administering	  the	  identification	  task.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  in	  Experiment	  1A,	  participants	  immediately	  focused	  their	  attention	  on	  the	  identification	  task	  and	  were	  therefore	  not	  recognizing	  or	  being	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  mirror.	  	  	   Second,	  when	  tasked	  with	  making	  an	  identification,	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  written	  instructions	  rather	  than	  verbal	  instructions	  in	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  vocal	  bias	  and	  to	  provide	  clear	  directions.	  The	  directions	  were	  written	  as	  follows:	  	   	  Please	  identify	  the	  culprit	  from	  the	  video	  using	  the	  photospread	  provided.	  Record	  your	  identification	  by	  marking	  the	  box	  on	  the	  identification	  sheet	  that	  corresponds	  with	  the	  chosen	  suspect.	  When	  you	  are	  finished,	  please	  remain	  seated;	  the	  examiner	  will	  return	  shortly.	  	  The	  third	  difference	  in	  Experiment	  1B	  is	  that	  unbiased	  instructions	  were	  omitted	  due	  to	  the	  confusion	  that	  some	  participants	  experienced	  in	  Experiment	  1A	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  make	  an	  identification.	  The	  unbiased	  instructions	  were	  also	  eliminated	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  perhaps,	  the	  forced	  choice	  would	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  confidence	  or	  anxiety.	  Thus,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  three	  changes	  noted	  above,	  Experiment	  1B	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  same	  way	  and	  using	  the	  same	  materials	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1A.	  	  
Results	  	  	   Twenty-­‐four	  undergraduate	  psychology	  students	  (16	  women,	  8	  men)	  aged	  17	  to	  21	  years	  old	  (M	  =	  18.46,	  SD	  =	  0.97)	  participated	  in	  Experiment	  1B.	  All	  but	  one	  participant	  made	  an	  identification	  from	  the	  target-­‐absent	  lineup.	  Table	  5	  lists	  the	  frequency	  of	  misidentifications	  per	  lineup	  member	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  lineup	  member	  3	  was	  misidentified	  most	  frequently	  (41.7%	  of	  misidentifications).	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   Subsequent	  to	  making	  an	  identification,	  participants	  rated	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  
at	  all)	  to	  6	  (extremely)	  how	  hard	  they	  tried	  on	  the	  task,	  how	  much	  they	  cared	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response,	  and	  how	  strong	  a	  desire	  they	  had	  to	  perform	  above	  average	  on	  this	  task.	  A	  series	  of	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  were	  used	  to	  compare	  participant’s	  ratings	  to	  the	  midpoint	  of	  the	  scale	  and	  reveal	  that	  participants	  scores	  were	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  midpoint	  and	  that	  participants:	  reported	  trying	  significantly	  hard	  on	  the	  task	  (M	  =	  4.22,	  SD	  =	  1.31),	  t(23)=4.57,	  p	  =	  <	  .001;	  caring	  significantly	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  (M	  =	  4.54,	  SD	  =	  1.02),	  t(23)=7.40,	  p	  <	  .001;	  and	  having	  a	  significant	  desire	  to	  perform	  above	  average	  on	  this	  task	  (M	  =	  4.4.3,	  SD	  =	  1.29),	  t(23)=5.43,	  p	  <.001.	  Although	  participants	  overall	  scores	  suggest	  that	  participants	  were	  motivated	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  study,	  a	  series	  of	  two-­‐sample	  independent	  groups	  t-­‐test	  indicate	  that	  this	  differed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  condition	  (mirror	  versus	  no-­‐mirror).	  Although	  participants	  tried	  equally	  as	  hard	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  (try),	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  cared	  significantly	  less	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  (care)	  and	  had	  a	  significantly	  lower	  desire	  to	  perform	  above	  average	  (desire)	  (Table	  6).	  	  
	   A	  series	  of	  two-­‐sample	  independent	  groups	  t-­‐tests	  were	  conducted	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  were	  any	  significant	  differences	  in	  POMS-­‐SF	  (Shacham,	  1983)	  scores	  between	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition.	  Results	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition’s	  reported	  feelings	  of:	  vigor-­‐activity,	  depression-­‐dejection,	  confusion-­‐bewilderment,	  tension-­‐anxiety,	  anger-­‐hostility,	  or	  fatigue-­‐inertia	  (Table	  7).	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   Subsequently,	  a	  series	  of	  tests	  were	  used	  to	  evaluate	  STAI	  scores	  (Speilberger	  et	  al.,	  1983).	  The	  average	  state	  anxiety	  score	  was	  40.06	  (SD	  =	  8.21)	  and	  the	  average	  trait	  anxiety	  score	  was	  41.25	  (SD	  =	  7.60).	  As	  expected,	  women	  reported	  significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  trait	  anxiety	  (M	  =	  43.31,	  SD	  =	  7.35)	  when	  compared	  to	  men	  (M	  =	  37.13,	  SD	  =	  6.71),	  t(22)=	  -­‐1.99,	  	  p	  =	  .05;	  however,	  contrary	  to	  expectations,	  women’s	  reported	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  (M	  =	  41.71,	  SD	  =	  8.38)	  did	  not	  differ	  from	  men’s	  reported	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  (M	  =	  36.75,	  SD	  =	  7.22	  ),	  t(22)=-­‐1.42,	  p	  	  =	  1.67).	  Additionally,	  participants	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  40.07,	  
SD	  =	  8.63)	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	  than	  participant’s	  levels	  of	  state	  anxiety	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  40.04,	  SD	  =	  8.10),	  t(22)=-­‐0.00,	  	  p	  =	  .99.	  	  	   Confidence	  scores	  reported	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  (extremely)	  demonstrate	  that	  overall,	  participant’s	  confidence	  scores	  (M	  =	  2.83,	  SD	  =1	  .52)	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  from	  the	  scale’s	  midpoint	  t(23)=-­‐0.53,	  p	  =	  .59.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  confidence	  reports	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  2.69,	  SD	  =	  1.25)	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition	  (M	  =	  3.00,	  SD	  =	  1.84),	  
t(22)=	  0.48,	  p	  =	  .63.	  	  
Discussion	  	   Experiment	  1B	  was	  designed	  to	  manipulate	  eyewitness	  anxiety;	  however,	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  did	  not	  increase	  participants	  state	  anxiety	  levels.	  Participants	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  in	  front	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  did	  not	  report	  higher	  levels	  of	  state-­‐anxiety	  when	  compared	  to	  participants	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror.	  Though	  there	  is	  evidence	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  and	  anxiety,	  Mor	  and	  Winquist	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(2002)	  report	  that	  the	  evidence	  has	  been	  mixed.	  Mor	  and	  Winquist	  conducted	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  149	  studies	  and	  synthesized	  226	  effect	  sizes	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  relationship	  between	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  and	  negative	  affect	  (i.e.	  depression,	  anxiety,	  and	  negative	  mood).	  What	  Mor	  and	  Winquist	  found	  was	  that	  of	  the	  three	  forms	  of	  negative	  affect	  included	  in	  their	  meta-­‐analysis,	  depression	  was	  more	  strongly	  associated	  with	  self-­‐focus	  than	  was	  anxiety.	  	  In	  addition,	  although	  mirrors	  are	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  manipulation	  of	  self-­‐focus,	  studies	  using	  mirrors	  as	  a	  manipulation	  of	  self-­‐focus	  had	  generally	  small	  effect	  sizes.	  	  	  	   Mor	  and	  Winquist’s	  (2002)	  finding	  that	  depression	  is	  more	  strongly	  associated	  with	  self-­‐focus	  than	  anxiety	  is	  particularly	  illuminating	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  the	  results	  for	  Experiment	  1B.	  For,	  not	  only	  does	  it	  help	  explain	  why	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  did	  not	  increase	  participants	  state	  anxiety	  levels,	  but	  it	  also	  helps	  to	  understand	  the	  unforeseen	  effects	  that	  the	  mirror	  had	  on	  eyewitness	  performance.	  The	  results	  from	  Experiment	  1B	  revealed	  that	  when	  compared	  to	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition,	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  reported	  caring	  significantly	  less	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  the	  study	  and	  had	  a	  significantly	  lower	  desire	  to	  perform	  above	  average	  on	  the	  task.	  Given	  Mor	  and	  Winquist’s	  findings,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  mirror	  evoked	  depressive	  symptoms,	  such	  as	  self-­‐doubt,	  that	  caused	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror	  condition	  to	  not	  care	  about	  the	  task,	  or	  about	  performing	  above	  average	  on	  the	  task.	  	  	   Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  mirror	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  participants	  state	  anxiety	  levels	  in	  Experiment	  1A	  and	  Experiment	  1B,	  the	  research	  in	  Experiment	  2	  shifts	  
SOCIAL	  ANXIETY	  AND	  MEMORY	  CONFORMITY	   34	  
direction	  to	  expand	  upon	  a	  paradigm	  wherein	  dispositional	  anxiety	  is	  known	  to	  interact	  with	  memory	  conformity	  (Wright,	  Busnello,	  Burattto,	  &	  Stein,	  2012).	  	  	  
EXPERIMENT	  2	  	   Previous	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  causal	  explanations	  for	  the	  conformity	  effects	  on	  eyewitnesses,	  including	  effects	  of	  eyewitness	  confidence	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009;	  Wright	  &	  Villabla,	  2012),	  co-­‐witness	  relationship	  type	  (French,	  Garry,	  &	  Mori,	  2008;	  Hope	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  physical	  characteristics	  of	  suspects	  (Zajac	  &	  Henderson,	  2009),	  and	  response	  order	  (Wright,	  Mathews,	  &	  Skagerberg,	  2005;	  Skagerberg	  &	  Wright,	  2009).	  Yet,	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  individual	  differences	  influence	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐witness	  interactions	  on	  memory	  conformity,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  evaluate	  how	  attuned	  co-­‐witnesses	  are	  to	  socially	  transmitted	  information	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter,	  2010).	  For,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  justice	  system’s	  tendency	  to	  ignore	  recommendations	  for	  procedures	  to	  evaluate	  eyewitness	  evidence	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001),	  understanding	  the	  effect	  of	  individual	  differences	  on	  memory	  conformity	  could	  potentially	  effect	  meaningful	  change	  in	  eyewitness	  procedures.	  	   Wells	  (1978)	  draws	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  system	  variables	  and	  
estimator	  variables,	  and	  the	  respective	  utility	  of	  eyewitness	  research	  that	  focuses	  on	  either	  category	  of	  variables.	  System	  variables	  refer	  to	  variables	  that	  are	  under	  the	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  justice	  system	  (e.g.,	  lineup	  presentation,	  lineup	  content,	  police	  interrogation	  methods;	  Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2003),	  whereas	  estimator	  variables	  cannot	  be	  controlled	  in	  criminal	  cases	  (e.g.,	  race	  of	  the	  culprit,	  personality	  type	  of	  the	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victim,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  weapon	  during	  a	  crime;	  Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2003).	  Although	  the	  effect	  of	  estimator	  variables	  can	  only	  be	  estimated	  in	  real	  life	  cases,	  estimator	  variables	  are	  important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  estimator	  variables	  can	  help	  researchers	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  eyewitness	  memory	  performance.	  Second,	  once	  researchers	  have	  developed	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  given	  estimator	  variable	  and	  eyewitness	  performance,	  researchers	  can	  endeavor	  to	  find	  system	  variables	  that	  can	  help	  mitigate	  the	  detriments	  of	  the	  estimator	  variable	  in	  question	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001).	  The	  later	  strategy	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  well-­‐known	  and	  important	  estimator	  variable:	  race	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001).	  	  	   Eyewitnesses	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  misidentify	  a	  suspect	  of	  their	  own	  race	  than	  they	  are	  to	  misidentify	  a	  suspect	  of	  another	  race	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001).	  Known	  as	  “the	  other-­‐race	  effect,”	  the	  estimator	  variable	  of	  an	  eyewitness’s	  race	  is,	  according	  to	  Wells	  and	  Olson,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  extensively	  researched	  variable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  eyewitness	  identification	  performance	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  p.	  230).	  A	  recent	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  39	  studies	  (91	  effect	  sizes)	  that	  tested	  participants’	  memories	  for	  other-­‐race	  and	  same-­‐race	  faces	  demonstrates	  that	  mistaken	  identifications	  are	  1.56	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  cross-­‐racial	  identifications	  than	  they	  are	  to	  occur	  in	  within-­‐race	  identifications	  (Meissner	  &	  Brigham,	  2001).	  Yet,	  Wells	  and	  Olson	  argue	  that	  establishing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  other-­‐race	  effect	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  must	  be	  accepted	  as	  unchangeable	  fact.	  Rather,	  researchers	  argue	  that	  system	  variables	  can	  be	  used	  to	  mitigate	  the	  other-­‐race	  effect.	  For	  example,	  Wells	  and	  Olson	  suggest	  that	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  fillers	  (i.e.,	  lineup	  members	  who	  are	  known	  to	  be	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innocent)	  in	  a	  lineup	  can	  decrease	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  other	  race	  effect	  and	  help	  minimize	  the	  chances	  that	  a	  witness	  will	  choose	  an	  unknown	  innocent	  suspect.	  Importantly,	  such	  a	  recommendation	  for	  decreasing	  cross-­‐racial	  misidentifications	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  first	  researching	  race	  as	  an	  estimator	  variable.	  It	  is	  with	  this	  logic	  in	  mind	  that	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  expanding	  research	  on	  an	  estimator	  variable	  that	  has	  only	  recently	  attracted	  empirical	  attention	  in	  the	  context	  of	  memory	  conformity:	  social	  anxiety	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter,	  2010;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
Social	  Anxiety	  and	  Memory	  Conformity	  	  	   Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter	  (2010)	  posit	  that	  some	  individuals	  are	  more	  attuned	  to	  socially	  transmitted	  information	  than	  others.	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  is	  receptive	  of	  socially	  transmitted	  information	  will	  influence	  the	  likelihood	  that	  he	  or	  she	  will	  combine	  his	  or	  her	  beliefs	  with	  the	  beliefs	  of	  a	  co-­‐witness,	  thereby	  engaging	  in	  memory	  conformity	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter).	  	  	   There	  are	  two	  primary	  components	  of	  social	  anxiety:	  social	  avoidance	  and	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter,	  2010).	  Wright	  et	  al.	  contends	  that	  although	  social	  avoidance	  and	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  are	  positively	  correlated	  (La	  Greca	  et	  al.,	  1988),	  the	  two	  constructs	  will	  have	  opposite	  effects	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  social	  situations,	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  constantly	  at	  risk	  for	  behaving	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  cause	  others	  to	  view	  them	  negatively	  (e.g.,	  awkward,	  unintelligent,	  incompetent,	  flawed,	  Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter	  contend	  that	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  who	  score	  high	  on	  fear	  of	  negative	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evaluation	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  disagreeing	  with	  their	  co-­‐witness	  is	  high.	  This	  notion	  is	  supported	  by	  evidence	  from	  Baron,	  Vandello,	  and	  Brunsman	  (1996)	  who	  report	  that	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  others	  when	  the	  cost	  of	  disagreeing	  is	  high	  (e.g.,	  identification	  accuracy	  will	  be	  used	  to	  inform	  the	  State’s	  eyewitness	  identification	  procedures)	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  making	  an	  error	  is	  low.	  Conversely,	  Wright,	  London	  and	  Waechter	  predict	  that	  socially	  anxious	  people	  who	  score	  high	  on	  socially	  avoidance	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  memory	  conformity	  because	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  pay	  less	  attention	  to	  socially	  transmitted	  information	  and	  therefore	  will	  be	  less	  influenced	  by	  others.	  Therefore,	  those	  who	  are	  socially	  avoidant	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  absorb	  and	  incorporate	  co-­‐witness	  information	  into	  their	  memory	  reports	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  	   Indeed,	  Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter	  (2010)	  found	  evidence	  to	  support	  their	  theory	  regarding	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  social	  anxiety	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  In	  their	  study,	  98	  adolescents	  completed	  an	  individual	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  the	  Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  for	  Adolescents	  (SAS-­‐A)	  (La	  Greca	  &	  Lopez,	  1998)	  which	  contains	  three	  subscales:	  1)	  Fear	  of	  Negative	  Evaluation	  (FNE)	  general	  social	  avoidance	  and	  distress	  (SAD-­‐General),	  and	  social	  avoidance	  and	  distress	  in	  new	  situations	  (SAD-­‐New).	  Next,	  participants	  completed	  a	  facial	  recognition	  task	  in	  pairs;	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  task	  required	  each	  pair	  to	  sit	  together	  and	  view	  50	  photos	  of	  faces	  (for	  2	  seconds	  each	  with	  no	  time	  interval	  between	  photos).	  Participants	  were	  then	  informed	  that	  they	  would	  complete	  a	  memory	  task,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  be	  shown	  100	  photos	  that	  were	  a	  mix	  of	  old	  (previously	  seen)	  or	  new	  (not	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previously	  seen)	  photos	  of	  faces.	  Researchers	  instructed	  participants	  to	  mark	  on	  their	  shared	  answer	  sheet	  whether	  a	  given	  photo	  was	  old	  or	  new.	  In	  this	  study,	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  answer	  first	  (control	  group)	  or	  second	  (PEI	  group)	  for	  the	  entire	  experiment.	  The	  control	  group	  provided	  data	  regarding	  baseline	  recognition	  accuracy,	  and	  those	  who	  answered	  second	  provided	  conformity	  data.	  When	  the	  second	  respondent	  provided	  the	  same	  answer	  as	  the	  first	  respondent,	  memory	  conformity	  occurred.	  	  	   As	  predicted	  participants’	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  scores	  were	  positively	  correlated	  with	  memory	  conformity	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter,	  2010).	  Researchers	  also	  found	  that	  social	  avoidance	  was	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  memory	  conformity,	  but	  only	  after	  controlling	  for	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  and	  only	  using	  participants’	  scores	  of	  social	  avoidance	  and	  distress	  in	  new	  situations.	  This	  study	  was	  the	  first	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  relationship	  between	  memory	  conformity	  and	  social	  avoidance.	  Further,	  Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter’s	  study	  validates	  the	  need	  for	  researchers	  to	  continue	  to	  explore	  how	  personality	  variables	  influence	  memory	  suggestibility.	  	  	   In	  a	  subsequent	  study,	  Wright	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  sought	  to	  replicate	  and	  expand	  upon	  Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter’s	  (2010)	  findings	  by	  assessing	  the	  relationship	  between	  memory	  conformity	  and	  social	  avoidance	  within	  a	  sample	  of	  college	  students.	  In	  this	  study,	  researchers	  modified	  their	  design	  and	  used	  a	  slightly	  different	  memory	  task,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  different	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  the	  Liebowitz	  Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  (LSAS)	  (Liebowitz,	  1987).	  The	  modified	  recognition	  task	  was	  completed	  in	  two	  parts	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2	  days.	  During	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	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The	  Present	  Research	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   It	  seems	  plausible,	  however,	  that	  there	  are	  conditions	  under	  which	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  are	  more,	  or	  even	  equally	  as	  likely	  as	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  memory	  conformity.	  A	  marked	  characteristic	  of	  social	  anxiety	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  direct	  attention	  toward	  the	  self	  (Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008).	  Most	  researchers	  agree	  that	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  is	  the	  “critical	  attentional	  process”	  among	  socially	  anxious	  individuals,	  who	  typically	  focus	  on	  negative	  internal	  thoughts	  during	  social	  interactions	  (Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008,	  p.	  1207).	  There	  is	  a	  discrepancy,	  however,	  regarding	  how	  vigilant	  socially	  anxious	  people	  are	  to	  sources	  of	  external	  threat	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995;	  Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997;	  Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008).	  Some	  researchers	  (Mogg,	  Phillippot,	  &	  Bradley,	  2004)	  have	  provided	  evidence	  that	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  demonstrate	  an	  attentional	  bias	  to	  external	  sources	  of	  threat,	  whereas	  other	  researchers	  (Mansell,	  Clark,	  &	  Ehlers,	  2003;	  Pineles	  &	  Mineka,	  2005;	  Schultz	  &	  Heimberg,	  2008)	  have	  found	  that	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  demonstrate	  an	  attentional	  bias	  toward	  internal	  threat	  cues	  (i.e.,	  physiological	  cues,	  negative	  thoughts)	  that	  detracts	  attentional	  focus	  from	  external	  sources	  of	  information.	  In	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  this	  empirical	  discrepancy,	  Schultz	  and	  Heimberg	  (2008)	  posit	  that	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  a	  social	  interaction,	  individuals	  with	  social	  anxiety	  engage	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  attentional	  processes;	  however,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  what	  motivates	  the	  shifts	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  attentional	  focus.	  Another	  explanation,	  perhaps,	  is	  that	  the	  context	  of	  the	  social	  interaction	  influences	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  socially	  anxious	  individual	  attends	  to	  internal	  or	  external	  sources	  of	  information.	  Such	  a	  shift	  in	  attentional	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focus	  would,	  according	  to	  Wright,	  London,	  and	  Waechter	  (2010)	  influence	  susceptibility	  to	  memory	  conformity.	  	  	   Only	  two	  previous	  studies	  have	  demonstrated	  a	  relationship	  between	  social	  avoidance	  and	  memory	  conformity,	  and	  neither	  of	  the	  two	  studies	  manipulated	  social	  context.	  Experiment	  2	  sought	  to	  fill	  this	  empirical	  void	  by	  replicating	  and	  expanding	  upon	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  (2012)	  experimental	  paradigm	  to	  determine	  if	  manipulating	  the	  social	  context	  –	  and	  therefore,	  attentional	  focus	  –	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  memory	  conformity	  rates.	  Experiment	  2	  determined	  if	  manipulating	  task	  instructions	  prior	  to	  a	  memory	  recognition	  task	  can	  cause	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  to	  be	  more,	  equally,	  or	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  memory	  conformity.	  	  	   Previous	  research	  demonstrates	  that	  without	  manipulating	  the	  social	  context,	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  to	  engage	  in	  memory	  conformity	  (Wright,	  London,	  &	  Waechter,	  2010;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  the	  no-­‐motivation	  condition	  is	  designed	  to	  replicate	  previous	  findings;	  therefore,	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐motivation	  condition	  will	  only	  receive	  basic	  task	  instructions.	  Without	  manipulating	  the	  social	  context,	  individual	  differences	  in	  social	  avoidance	  should,	  by	  itself,	  show	  that	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conform	  less	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants.	  	  	   Research	  involving	  socially	  avoidant	  college	  students	  reveals	  that	  individuals	  who	  are	  self-­‐focused	  and	  doubt	  their	  competency	  to	  perform	  adequately	  in	  social	  situations	  are	  less	  concerned	  about	  how	  well	  they	  actually	  perform	  and	  instead,	  are	  focused	  on	  escaping	  the	  social	  situation	  (Burgio,	  Merluzzi,	  &	  Pryor,	  1986).	  In	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Experiment	  2,	  a	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  was	  designed	  by	  drawing	  on	  this	  notion	  to	  predict	  that	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  –	  who	  by	  definition,	  are	  not	  confident	  in	  their	  social	  abilities	  and	  are	  motivated	  to	  avoid	  social	  situations	  –	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  their	  partner	  when	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  prolonged,	  confrontational	  social	  encounter	  exists.	  Under	  this	  condition,	  the	  threat	  of	  confrontation	  (or	  even	  conversation)	  should	  heighten	  the	  socially-­‐avoidant	  participant’s	  motivation	  to	  escape	  the	  social	  situation	  and	  thereby	  increase	  their	  conformity.	  	  	   Last,	  in	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  the	  differences	  in	  conformity	  rates	  among	  socially	  avoidant	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants’	  tendencies	  to	  conform,	  a	  third	  group	  of	  participants	  will	  be	  informed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  cash	  reward	  for	  the	  most	  accurate	  participant	  (monetary	  incentive).	  Though	  Baron	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  social	  context	  profoundly	  shapes	  conformity,	  Baron	  et	  al.	  also	  contend	  that	  when	  there	  are	  financial	  incentives	  for	  accuracy,	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  resist	  the	  pressure	  to	  conform.	  In	  this	  condition,	  the	  appeal	  of	  a	  monetary	  reward	  should	  overshadow	  any	  personality	  differences	  in	  likelihood	  to	  conform,	  ensuring	  that	  conformity	  rates	  are	  equal	  between	  the	  socially	  avoidant	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants.	  	  	   Thus,	  in	  Experiment	  2	  it	  is	  predicted	  that	  in	  the	  no-­‐motivation	  condition,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  conform	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants;	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  to	  conform;	  and	  in	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  condition,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  will	  be	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equally	  as	  likely	  as	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  to	  engage	  in	  memory	  conformity	  [see	  Figure	  1	  for	  predicted	  results].	  
Method	  
Participants	  	   One	  hundred	  and	  twenty	  participants	  (90	  women,	  30	  men)	  completed	  Experiment	  2.	  Participants	  ranged	  in	  age	  from	  18	  to	  24	  (M	  =	  19.7,	  SD	  =	  1.35)	  years.	  The	  majority	  (65%)	  of	  participants	  identified	  as	  White,	  13.6%	  as	  Asian,	  10%	  as	  African	  American,	  4.8%	  as	  Hispanic,	  3.3%	  as	  Mixed	  Race,	  0.8%	  as	  Middle	  Eastern,	  and	  1.6%	  opted	  not	  to	  report	  their	  race.	  	  	   Participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  a	  small	  liberal	  arts	  college.	  Participants	  were	  recruited	  through	  e-­‐mail	  advertisements	  to	  the	  general	  student	  population	  and	  also	  from	  introductory	  neuroscience	  and	  psychology	  courses.	  The	  only	  restriction	  placed	  upon	  participation	  was	  that	  students	  not	  sign	  up	  to	  participate	  with	  a	  friend	  in	  the	  second	  portion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  Students	  received	  either	  $10	  or	  partial	  course	  credit	  for	  their	  participation	  in	  this	  experiment.	  Informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  prior	  to	  beginning	  the	  experiment.	  
Materials	  
Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  and	  Empathy	  Quotient	  	   Subsequent	  to	  providing	  informed	  consent,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  an	  online	  questionnaire	  that	  was	  comprised	  of:	  (1)	  questions	  regarding	  basic	  demographic	  information	  (e.g.,	  age,	  gender,	  race),	  (2)	  a	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  and	  (3)	  a	  measure	  of	  empathy.	  To	  control	  for	  order	  effects,	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  either	  complete	  the	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  The	  Liebowitz	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Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  (LSAS),	  before	  the	  measure	  of	  empathy,	  the	  Empathy	  Quotient	  (EQ-­‐40),	  or	  to	  complete	  the	  EQ	  before	  the	  LSAS	  (Liebowtiz,	  1987;	  Lawrence,	  Shaw,	  Baker,	  Baron-­‐Cohen,	  &	  David,	  2004).	  	  	   The	  Liebowitz	  Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  (LSAS)	  (Liebowitz,	  1987)	  is	  a	  24	  item	  questionnaire	  that	  requires	  participants	  to	  rate	  their	  feelings	  of	  anxiety	  within	  a	  variety	  of	  situations,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  those	  situations.	  The	  questionnaire	  is	  comprised	  of	  13	  items	  to	  address	  performance	  situations	  (e.g.,	  “participating	  in	  small	  groups,”	  p.	  152)	  and	  11	  items	  to	  address	  social	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  “talking	  to	  people	  in	  authority,”	  p.	  152).	  For	  each	  item,	  participants	  rate	  how	  anxious	  or	  fearful	  they	  feel	  in	  each	  situation	  (using	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (none)	  to	  3	  (severe)),	  and	  also	  how	  often	  they	  avoid	  each	  situation	  (using	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (never)	  to	  3	  (usually))	  (p.	  152)	  (see	  appendix	  E).	  The	  LSAS	  thus	  provides	  an	  overall	  score	  of	  social	  anxiety,	  as	  well	  as	  six	  additional	  scores:	  total	  avoidance,	  avoidance	  of	  social	  interaction,	  avoidance	  of	  performance,	  total	  anxiety,	  performance	  anxiety,	  and	  anxiety	  during	  social	  interactions	  (Heimberg	  &	  Holaway,	  2006).	  	   Heimberg	  and	  Holaway	  (2006)	  contend	  that	  the	  LSAS	  is	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  Heimberg	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  have	  determined	  that	  the	  LSAS	  has	  “excellent	  internal	  consistency”	  and	  that	  the	  LSAS	  is	  a	  reliable	  and	  valid	  measure	  of	  social	  anxiety.	  Furthermore,	  Heimberg	  and	  Holaway	  (2006)	  found	  that,	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  accuracy,	  the	  LSAS	  can	  differentiate	  between:	  (1)	  patients	  with	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  and	  non-­‐anxious	  controls,	  (2)	  patients	  with	  social	  anxiety	  and	  patients	  with	  generalized	  anxiety	  disorder	  (GAD),	  and	  (3)	  different	  subtypes	  of	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  (Heimberg	  &	  Holaway,	  2006).	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   The	  Empathy	  Quotient	  (EQ-­‐40)	  is	  a	  40	  item	  questionnaire	  that	  requires	  participants	  to	  rate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  strongly	  agree,	  slightly	  agree,	  slightly	  disagree,	  or	  strongly	  disagree	  with	  statements	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  assess	  empathy	  (Baron-­‐Cohen	  &	  Wheelwright,	  2004)	  (see	  appendix	  F).	  Empathy	  is	  a	  complex	  construct	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  define;	  consequently,	  psychologists	  have	  contested	  how	  to	  best	  define	  and	  measure	  empathy.	  The	  EQ-­‐40	  was	  created	  to	  measure	  empathy	  as	  defined	  by	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  and	  Wheelwright	  as	  “…	  the	  drive	  or	  ability	  to	  attribute	  mental	  states	  to	  another	  person/animal,	  and	  entails	  an	  appropriate	  affective	  response	  in	  the	  observer	  to	  the	  other	  person’s	  mental	  state.”	  (p.	  168).	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  and	  Wheelwright	  posited	  their	  definition	  of	  empathy	  to	  a	  panel	  of	  six	  judges	  along	  with	  60	  items	  (40	  items	  to	  measure	  empathy	  and	  20	  filler	  items)	  to	  determine	  if	  each	  item	  fit	  with	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  and	  Wheelwright’s	  notion	  of	  empathy.	  Indeed,	  researchers	  found	  that	  five	  out	  of	  six	  judges	  rated	  each	  of	  the	  40	  items	  used	  in	  the	  EQ	  as	  consistent	  with	  Baron-­‐Cohen	  and	  Wheelwright’s	  definition	  of	  empathy.	  	   Further,	  researchers	  have	  found	  that	  the	  EQ-­‐40	  can	  discriminate	  between	  adults	  with	  Asperger’s	  Syndrome	  (AS)	  or	  High-­‐Functioning	  Autism	  (HFA)	  who	  demonstrate	  clinical	  difficulty	  with	  empathy,	  and	  aged-­‐matched	  controls	  (Cohen	  &	  Wheelwright,	  2004).	  Further,	  Cohen	  and	  Wheelwright	  found	  that	  within	  the	  normal	  control	  group,	  women	  score	  significantly	  higher	  than	  men,	  a	  finding	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  on	  individual	  differences	  in	  empathy.	  Thus,	  the	  EQ-­‐40	  can	  adequately	  discriminate	  between	  those	  with	  AS/HFA	  and	  age-­‐matched	  controls,	  and	  is	  also	  sensitive	  to	  reported	  gender	  differences	  within	  a	  normal	  control	  sample.	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Video	  and	  Slideshow	  of	  Faces	  	   In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  viewed	  a	  2-­‐minute	  long	  video	  of	  60	  color	  photographs	  of	  Black	  men	  who	  were	  photographed	  from	  the	  shoulders	  up,	  and	  wearing	  maroon	  sweatshirts.	  Each	  photo	  was	  shown	  for	  1	  second,	  with	  1-­‐second	  intervals	  between	  photos.	  There	  were	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  video:	  video	  A	  and	  
video	  B.	  The	  difference	  between	  videos	  A	  and	  B	  was	  that	  each	  video	  contained	  an	  entirely	  different	  set	  of	  faces.	  The	  first	  group	  of	  26	  participants	  all	  viewed	  video	  A,	  but	  all	  subsequent	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  watch	  either	  video	  A	  or	  
video	  B.	  	  
	   The	  slideshow	  of	  faces	  that	  was	  used	  for	  the	  old-­‐new	  task	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  all	  the	  photos	  from	  both	  video	  A	  and	  video	  B.	  All	  120	  photos	  in	  the	  slideshow	  were	  randomized	  and	  presented	  using	  PowerPoint.	  	  
Partner	  Relationship,	  Confidence	  Rating,	  and	  Task	  Engagement	  Questionnaire	  	   After	  completing	  the	  old-­‐new	  task,	  all	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  a	  questionnaire	  designed	  to	  determine	  if	  participants	  knew	  each	  other	  and	  if	  participants	  felt	  comfortable	  interacting	  with	  their	  partner	  (see	  appendix	  G).	  Participants	  were	  also	  asked	  how	  confident	  they	  were	  in	  the	  accuracy	  of	  their	  identifications,	  and	  how	  engaged	  they	  were	  in	  the	  experiment	  (e.g.,	  “How	  much	  did	  
you	  care	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  this	  study?”).	  	  
Procedure	  
Scheduling	  	  	   The	  first	  26	  participants	  who	  participated	  in	  this	  experiment	  signed	  up	  to	  complete	  part	  2	  upon	  their	  arrival	  to	  complete	  part	  1.	  However,	  this	  scheduling	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method	  was	  time	  consuming	  and	  posed	  the	  risk	  that	  participants	  might	  establish	  rapport	  prior	  to	  completing	  the	  old/new	  task.	  Therefore,	  the	  experimenter	  contacted	  all	  subsequent	  participants	  via	  e-­‐mail	  to	  schedule	  part	  2.	  
Part	  1:	  Video	  Exposure,	  Completion	  of	  LSAS	  and	  EQ	  	  	  	   Participants	  completed	  part	  1	  in	  groups	  that	  ranged	  in	  size	  from	  two	  to	  twelve	  participants.	  Eight	  participants	  completed	  part	  I	  on	  their	  own	  due	  to	  scheduling	  conflicts	  or	  missed	  sessions;	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  completed	  part	  1	  on	  their	  own,	  seven	  completed	  part	  1	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  experimenter	  and	  one	  participant	  completed	  part	  1	  on	  her	  own	  (after	  receiving	  the	  same	  detailed	  instructions	  that	  other	  participants	  received).	  	  	   The	  participants	  who	  completed	  part	  1	  in	  groups,	  did	  so	  in	  a	  campus	  computer	  lab.	  After	  obtaining	  informed	  consent,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  complete	  the	  online	  questionnaire	  that	  was	  pre-­‐loaded	  on	  their	  screen	  (consisting	  of	  the	  LSAS,	  EQ,	  and	  demographic	  questions),	  and	  then	  to	  watch	  the	  video	  of	  faces	  one	  time.	  Participants	  were	  then	  thanked	  for	  their	  participation	  in	  part	  1,	  and	  reminded	  of	  the	  time	  that	  they	  were	  scheduled	  to	  complete	  part	  2.	  
Part	  2:	  Photo	  Recognition	  Task	   	  	  	   Participants	  completed	  part	  2	  within	  1	  to	  4	  days	  of	  completing	  part	  1.	  The	  average	  number	  of	  days	  between	  testing	  sessions	  was	  2.48	  (SD	  =	  0.71)	  days.	  	  The	  majority	  (87.5%)	  of	  participants	  completed	  part	  2	  either	  two	  or	  three	  days	  after	  completing	  part	  1,	  3	  participants	  (2.5%)	  completed	  part	  2	  the	  day	  after	  completing	  part	  1,	  and	  12	  participants	  (10%)	  completed	  part	  2	  four	  days	  after	  completing	  part	  1.	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  Although	  participants	  provided	  informed	  consent	  for	  both	  parts	  of	  the	  experiment	  at	  time	  1,	  participants	  signed	  an	  additional	  informed	  consent	  form	  at	  time	  2	  to	  signify	  that	  they	  consented	  to	  continue	  their	  participation.	  The	  experimenter	  then	  read	  participants	  the	  following	  task	  instructions:	  You	  will	  be	  shown	  a	  set	  of	  photos,	  some	  of	  which	  you	  saw	  during	  the	  study	  session	  and	  some	  of	  which	  are	  new	  and	  that	  you	  did	  not	  see	  in	  the	  study	  session.	  You	  will	  be	  instructed	  to	  mark	  on	  your	  answer	  sheet	  whether	  the	  photo	  was	  old	  (meaning	  you	  saw	  it	  in	  the	  study	  phase)	  or	  new	  (meaning	  you	  didn’t).	  So,	  when	  a	  photo	  is	  shown,	  participant	  A	  (use	  randomly	  selected	  
partner	  name)	  will	  mark	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  photo	  is	  old	  or	  new,	  and	  pass	  the	  sheet	  to	  participant	  B	  (use	  partner	  name)	  who	  will	  mark	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  photo	  is	  old	  or	  new.	  Then,	  participant	  B	  (use	  name)	  will	  hit	  enter,	  a	  new	  photo	  will	  appear,	  and	  he/she	  will	  mark	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  photo	  is	  old	  or	  new,	  and	  pass	  the	  sheet	  to	  participant	  A	  (use	  name).	  This	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  will	  continue	  until	  all	  photos	  have	  been	  shown.	  	  Prior	  to	  their	  arrival,	  each	  pair	  of	  participants	  was	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  three	  conditions:	  no	  motivation,	  forced	  unanimity,	  or	  monetary	  incentive.	  All	  participants	  received	  the	  basic	  task	  instructions;	  participants	  in	  the	  no	  motivation	  condition	  did	  not	  receive	  any	  instructions	  beyond	  the	  basic	  task	  instructions.	  Participant	  who	  were	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  received	  the	  following	  directions	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  basic	  task	  instructions:	  After	  the	  recognition	  task,	  we	  will	  have	  you	  go	  back	  through	  all	  the	  items	  on	  which	  you	  disagreed	  with	  your	  partner	  and	  see	  if	  you	  can	  come	  to	  an	  agreement.	  Sometimes	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation	  can	  resolve	  disagreements.	  While	  you	  make	  your	  initial	  judgment	  though,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remain	  focused	  on	  the	  screen.	  If	  there	  is	  limited	  or	  no	  disagreement	  during	  this	  initial	  rating	  task,	  you	  will	  move	  on	  to	  another	  portion	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  Participants	  in	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  condition	  received	  the	  following	  instructions	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  basic	  task	  instructions:	  After	  the	  recognition	  task,	  we	  will	  go	  through	  your	  answers	  to	  determine	  the	  accuracy	  of	  your	  answers.	  The	  most	  accurate	  participant	  will	  be	  awarded	  $10.	  (After	  the	  old/new	  task,	  participants	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  most	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accurate	  participant	  would	  be	  contacted	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  week	  to	  receive	  his	  or	  her	  reward	  money).	  	  	  	  	   Last,	  all	  participants,	  regardless	  of	  condition,	  were	  reminded	  that	  participant	  A	  answers	  first	  on	  all	  of	  the	  odd	  numbered	  photos	  and	  participant	  B	  answers	  first	  on	  all	  of	  the	  even	  numbered	  photos.	  The	  experimenter	  provided	  this	  reminder	  to	  ensure	  that	  participants	  did	  not	  lose	  track	  of	  who	  was	  supposed	  to	  answer	  first	  as	  they	  completed	  the	  task.	  	  	   After	  completing	  the	  old-­‐new	  task,	  participants	  filled	  out	  the	  Partner	  
Relationship,	  Confidence	  Rating,	  and	  Task	  Engagement	  Questionnaire.	  Upon	  completion	  of	  the	  questionnaire,	  participants	  were	  thanked	  for	  their	  participation	  and	  debriefed	  (see	  Appendix	  H).	  	  
Results	  
Conformity	  Scores	  	   During	  the	  photo	  recognition	  task,	  participants	  viewed	  120	  photos:	  60	  that	  they	  had	  previously	  seen	  in	  part	  1	  of	  the	  experiment	  (old	  photos)	  and	  60	  that	  they	  had	  not	  seen	  (new	  photos).	  Participants	  alternated	  answering	  first	  during	  the	  recognition	  task;	  only	  participants	  who	  answered	  second	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  were	  eligible	  to	  conform.	  Conformity	  occurred	  when	  the	  first	  respondent	  provided	  an	  incorrect	  answer	  (i.e.	  reported	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  old	  when	  in	  fact,	  it	  was	  new,	  or	  reported	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  new,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  old)	  and	  the	  second	  respondent	  provided	  the	  same	  incorrect	  answer.	  Three	  conformity	  scores	  were	  calculated,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  proportions	  reflecting	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  on	  which	  participants	  conformed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  trials	  on	  which	  they	  could	  have	  conformed.	  These	  scores	  yielded	  three	  dependent	  variables:	  total	  conformity,	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conformed	  on	  old,	  conformed	  on	  new.	  For	  ease	  of	  description,	  these	  proportions	  are	  represented	  as	  percentages	  throughout	  the	  results	  section.	  	  
Avoidance	  Grouping	  	   Participants	  provided	  an	  avoidance	  rating	  for	  each	  of	  the	  24	  items	  on	  the	  LSAS:	  12	  items	  addressed	  performance	  situations	  and	  12	  items	  addressed	  social	  interactions.	  Social	  interaction	  avoidance	  was	  calculated	  by	  summing	  the	  avoidance	  rating	  for	  the	  items	  that	  addressed	  social	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  looking	  at	  people	  you	  don’t	  know	  very	  well	  in	  the	  eyes,	  Liebowitz,	  1987),	  and	  performance	  avoidance	  was	  calculated	  by	  summing	  the	  avoidance	  rating	  for	  the	  items	  that	  addressed	  performance	  situations	  (e.g.,	  participating	  in	  small	  groups,	  Liebowitz,	  1987).	  Participants’	  total	  avoidance	  scores	  were	  calculated	  by	  adding	  their	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  and	  performance	  avoidance	  scores.	  	  	   The	  average	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  and	  the	  average	  performance	  avoidance	  score	  in	  Experiment	  2	  was	  12.37	  (SD	  =	  5.14)	  and	  13.23	  (SD	  =	  .64),	  respectively.	  The	  mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance,	  mean	  performance	  avoidance,	  and	  mean	  total	  avoidance	  scores	  were	  compared	  to	  the	  scores	  from	  a	  sample	  of	  34	  non-­‐anxious	  adult	  controls	  and	  a	  sample	  of	  46	  adults	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  (Heimberg	  &	  Holaway,	  2007).	  The	  mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  in	  Experiment	  2	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  3.24)	  from	  the	  sample	  of	  non-­‐anxious	  controls,	  t(118)=	  19.38,	  p	  <	  .001,	  and	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  18.20)	  from	  the	  sample	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder,	  t(118)=	  12.37,	  p	  <	  .001.	  The	  mean	  performance	  avoidance	  score	  in	  Experiment	  2	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	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mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  3.41)	  from	  the	  sample	  of	  non-­‐anxious	  controls,	  t(118)=	  19.01,	  p	  <	  .001,	  and	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  mean	  social	  interaction	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  16.70)	  from	  the	  sample	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder,	  t(118)=	  -­‐6.71,	  p	  <	  .001.	  Last,	  the	  mean	  total	  avoidance	  score	  from	  Experiment	  2	  (M	  =	  25.61,	  SD	  =	  9.89)	  was	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  mean	  total	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  6.65)	  from	  a	  sample	  of	  34	  non-­‐anxious	  adult	  controls,	  t(118)=	  10.90,	  p	  <	  .001,	  	  and	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  mean	  total	  avoidance	  score	  (M	  =	  34)	  from	  the	  sample	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  t(118)=	  -­‐10.24,	  p	  <	  .001	  (Heimberg	  &	  Holaway,).	  	  	   Participants	  total	  avoidance	  scores	  ranged	  from	  3	  to	  55	  and	  were	  normally	  distributed	  with	  an	  approximately	  symmetric	  skew	  of	  0.295	  (SE	  =	  0.22).	  Therefore,	  participants	  from	  Experiment	  2	  were	  divided	  into	  two	  groups	  using	  a	  median	  split	  (Mdn	  =	  25.00).	  Participants	  who	  had	  avoidance	  scores	  of	  25	  or	  below	  (53.8%	  of	  participants)	  were	  classified	  as	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant,	  and	  participants	  who	  had	  avoidance	  scores	  of	  26	  or	  higher	  (46.2%	  of	  participants)	  were	  classified	  as	  socially	  
avoidant.	  	  
Conformity	  and	  Social	  Avoidance	  as	  a	  function	  of	  Instructions	  	   A	  2	  (Social	  Avoidance	  Grouping:	  Socially	  Avoidant	  vs.	  Non-­‐Socially	  Avoidant)	  X	  3	  (Instructions:	  No	  Motivation	  vs.	  Forced	  Unanimity	  vs.	  Monetary	  Incentive)	  Analysis	  of	  Variance	  (ANOVA)	  was	  conducted	  to	  determine	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  avoidance	  grouping	  and	  instruction	  on	  participants	  total	  conformity	  scores.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  social	  avoidance	  grouping,	  F	  (1,113)=	  2.20,	  	  
p	  =	  .14,	  η2	  =	  .019,	  on	  conformity,	  but	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	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instructions,	  F(2,113)=	  4.89,	  p	  <	  .01,	  η2	  =	  .080,	  on	  conformity.	  Tukey	  HSD	  post	  hoc	  comparisons	  revealed	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  conformed	  on	  a	  significantly	  higher	  percentage	  of	  trials	  (M	  =	  75.79%)	  than	  did	  participants	  in	  either	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  (M	  =67.47%)	  or	  the	  no	  motivation	  (M	  =	  66.90%)	  conditions,	  p	  =	  .025	  and	  p	  =	  .016,	  respectively.	  The	  difference	  between	  conformity	  rates	  in	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  and	  no	  motivation	  conditions	  was	  not	  significant,	  p	  =	  .98.	  	  	   The	  interaction	  between	  social	  avoidance	  grouping	  and	  instruction	  approached	  significance,	  F	  (2,113)=	  2.894,	  p	  =	  .059,	  η2	  =	  .049,	  see	  Figure	  2.	  A	  series	  of	  simple	  effects	  tests	  were	  conducted	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  avoidance	  on	  conformity	  within	  each	  of	  the	  three	  instructions	  conditions.	  In	  the	  no	  motivation	  condition,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  (M	  =	  .6,	  SD	  =	  .10)	  were	  significantly	  less	  likely	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  (M	  =	  .73,	  SD	  =	  .13)	  to	  conform,	  t(37)=	  3.25,	  p	  	  =	  .002.	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  socially	  avoidant	  (M	  =	  .76,	  SD	  =	  .11)	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  (M	  =	  .75,	  SD	  =	  .11)	  participants	  conformity	  scores	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition,	  t(38)=	  -­‐0.17,	  p	  	  =	  .86,	  nor	  was	  there	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  socially	  avoidant	  (M	  =	  .68,	  SD	  =	  .15)	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  (M=	  .68,	  SD	  =	  .19)	  participants	  conformity	  scores	  in	  the	  monetary	  incentive	  condition	  t(38)=	  -­‐0.095,	  p	  =	  .93.	  	  	   Additional	  testing	  included	  three	  variables	  as	  covariates	  in	  the	  ANOVA	  analysis.	  First,	  number	  of	  days	  between	  testing	  session	  and	  initial	  photo	  exposure	  was	  used	  to	  determine	  if	  participants’	  conformity	  rates	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  between	  sessions.	  This	  variable	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,109)=	  0.52,	  p	  =	  .47,	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η2	  =	  .005.	  None	  of	  the	  effects	  reported	  above	  changed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  adding	  days	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  	  	   Second,	  friend	  status	  (friends	  with	  partner,	  not	  friends	  with	  partner)	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  to	  determine	  if	  conformity	  levels	  were	  affected	  by	  whether	  or	  not	  participants	  completed	  the	  photo	  recognition	  task	  with	  a	  friend,	  or	  with	  a	  stranger.	  This	  variable	  was	  significant,	  F(1,109)=	  18.50,	  p	  <	  .001,	  η2	  =	  .145,	  and	  revealed	  that	  when	  including	  friend	  status	  as	  a	  covariate,	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  avoidance	  grouping	  (F(1,109)	  =	  3.67,	  p	  	  =	  .058,	  η2	  =	  .032)	  approached	  significance,	  such	  that	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  (M	  =.67,	  SE	  =.018)	  conformed	  significantly	  less	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  (M	  =	  .71,	  SE	  =.016).	  The	  interaction	  pattern	  was	  unaffected	  when	  friend	  status	  was	  entered	  into	  the	  model	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  	   Last,	  empathy	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  covariate	  to	  determine	  if	  conformity	  was	  influenced	  by	  individual	  differences	  in	  empathy.	  This	  variable	  was	  not	  significant,	  
F(1,112)=	  0.14,	  p	  =	  .71,	  η2	  =	  .001,	  and	  none	  of	  the	  effects	  reported	  above	  changed	  when	  empathy	  was	  added	  as	  a	  covariate.	  	  	  
Conformity	  to	  Old	  and	  New	  Photos	  	   A	  2	  (Photo	  Type:	  Old	  v.	  New)	  X	  2	  (Social	  Avoidance	  Grouping:	  Socially	  Avoidant	  
vs.	  Non-­‐Socially	  Avoidant)	  X	  3	  (Instructions:	  No	  Motivation	  vs.	  Forced	  Unanimity	  vs.	  
Monetary	  Incentive)	  mixed	  model	  ANOVA	  was	  conducted	  with	  the	  photo	  type	  variable	  manipulated	  within	  subjects	  on	  participants’	  total	  conformity	  scores.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  photo	  type	  on	  conformity	  rates,	  F	  (1,	  113)=	  64.99,	  p	  <	  .001,	  η2	  =	  .37.	  Participants	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	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conform	  and	  report	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  old	  (M	  =	  .73,	  SE	  =	  .014)	  when	  it	  was	  actually	  new,	  than	  they	  were	  to	  conform	  and	  report	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  new	  (M	  =	  .53,	  SE	  =	  .021)	  when	  it	  was	  actually	  old.	  	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  interaction	  between	  photo	  type	  and	  condition	  (F	  (2,113)=	  2.00,	  p	  =	  .14,	  η2	  =	  .034),	  between	  photo	  type	  and	  avoidance	  grouping	  (F	  (1,113)=	  .037,	  p	  =.	  99,	  η2	  =	  .009),	  or	  between	  photo	  type,	  condition,	  and	  avoidance	  grouping	  (F	  (2,	  113)=	  1.29,	  p	  =	  .27,	  η2	  =	  .022.).	  	  
Discussion	  	   Experiment	  2	  was	  the	  first	  study	  to	  manipulate	  the	  social	  context	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  social	  avoidance	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  Socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conformed	  less	  than	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants;	  however,	  this	  main	  effect	  was	  qualified	  by	  a	  significant	  interaction	  in	  which	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  this	  difference	  emerged	  only	  in	  the	  no	  motivation	  condition.	  The	  relationship	  between	  conformity	  and	  social	  avoidance	  changed,	  as	  predicted,	  when	  participants	  were	  incentivized	  with	  a	  cash	  reward	  for	  memory	  accuracy.	  In	  the	  
monetary	  incentive	  condition,	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conformed	  as	  much	  as	  non-­‐avoidant	  participants.	  The	  results	  from	  Experiment	  2	  did	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition,	  conformity	  rates	  would	  be	  higher	  for	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  than	  for	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants.	  Instead,	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conformed	  equally	  as	  much	  as	  socially	  avoidant	  participants.	  	   	  	   Overall,	  participants	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  conformed	  more	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐motivation	  and	  monetary	  instruction	  condition.	  The	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  was	  designed	  to	  only	  be	  aversive	  to	  socially	  avoidant	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participants	  by	  posing	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  prolonged	  social	  encounter	  as	  a	  consequence	  for	  discrepant	  memory	  reports.	  The	  instructions	  were	  intended	  to	  draw	  on	  certain	  components	  of	  social	  interactions	  that	  socially	  avoidant	  people	  tend	  to	  avoid:	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussions,	  talking	  with	  and	  among	  strangers,	  working	  in	  a	  group,	  and	  expressing	  disagreement	  to	  strangers	  (Liebowitz,	  1987).	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  the	  instructions	  did	  successfully	  motivate	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  to	  conform	  more,	  as	  the	  conformity	  rates	  were	  significantly	  higher	  among	  socially	  avoidant	  participants	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  no-­‐motivation	  and	  monetary	  incentive	  condition.	  However,	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants’	  conformity	  rates	  were	  highest	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  for	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants,	  the	  prospect	  of	  prolonging	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  experiment	  for	  longer	  than	  they	  had	  initially	  anticipated	  was	  as	  undesirable	  as	  it	  was	  for	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  conformed	  more	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  shorten	  the	  length	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  increase	  conformity	  rates	  only	  among	  socially-­‐avoidant	  participants,	  future	  studies	  should	  make	  two	  changes	  to	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition.	  First,	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  lead	  participants	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  experiment	  will	  take	  longer	  than	  it	  actually	  does,	  so	  that	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  prolonged	  conversation	  will	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  additional	  punishment,	  but	  rather	  an	  included	  portion	  of	  the	  study.	  Second,	  the	  instructions	  should	  be	  modified	  such	  that	  participants	  are	  informed	  that	  they	  will	  have	  a	  discussion	  to	  determine	  why	  they	  disagreed	  in	  general,	  rather	  than	  why	  they	  disagreed	  on	  each	  item.	  Even	  for	  non-­‐
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avoidant	  participants,	  the	  prospect	  of	  discussing	  discrepancies	  for	  up	  to	  120	  items	  is	  likely	  undesirable	  and	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  higher	  conformity	  rates	  in	  Experiment	  2.	  	  	   	  	   Though	  the	  conformity	  rates	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition	  differed	  from	  what	  was	  expected,	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  that	  emerged	  from	  Experiment	  2	  was	  striking.	  Looking	  at	  socially	  avoidant	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants’	  conformity	  rates	  across	  all	  three	  instructions	  conditions,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  social	  context	  shaped	  conformity	  rates.	  For,	  when	  the	  context	  was	  not	  manipulated,	  individual	  differences	  in	  social	  avoidance	  directly	  influenced	  conformity	  rates;	  however,	  when	  the	  social	  context	  provided	  an	  incentive	  for	  accuracy,	  or	  an	  undesirable	  outcome	  for	  discrepant	  memory	  reports,	  individual	  differences	  in	  social	  avoidance	  were	  overshadowed.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  co-­‐witness	  performance,	  the	  latter	  finding	  is	  concerning	  –	  especially	  when	  considering	  that	  conformity	  rates	  were	  highest	  in	  the	  forced	  unanimity	  condition.	  For	  example,	  it’s	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  a	  situation	  wherein	  a	  co-­‐witness,	  after	  witnessing	  a	  crime	  and	  faced	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  long	  police	  investigation,	  might	  conform	  to	  his	  or	  her	  co-­‐witness’s	  memory	  report	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  having	  to	  explain,	  defend,	  and	  discuss	  a	  discrepant	  memory	  report	  with	  an	  authority	  figure	  (e.g.,	  police,	  lawyer).	  Disagreeing	  in	  such	  a	  context	  would	  carry	  a	  high	  cost	  and	  could	  influence	  conformity	  (Baron	  et	  al.,	  1996).	  When	  multiple	  people	  witness	  a	  crime,	  an	  eyewitness’s	  report	  can	  be	  contradicted	  by	  other	  witnesses’	  reports	  (Shaw	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Shaw	  et	  al.	  argue	  that	  when	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  for	  contradiction,	  a	  witness	  will	  decrease	  his	  or	  her	  public	  display	  of	  confidence	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  avoid	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  being	  highly	  confident	  and	  wrong	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(Shaw	  et	  al.).	  Even	  though	  Shaw	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  people’s	  private	  confidence	  ratings	  were	  higher	  than	  their	  public	  confidence	  ratings,	  Baron	  et	  al.	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  when	  the	  difficulty	  of	  a	  task	  is	  high,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  a	  correct	  response	  is	  also	  high,	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  to	  group	  members,	  even	  if	  the	  group	  member	  is	  incorrect.	  Consequently,	  in	  a	  context	  wherein	  the	  task	  (e.g.,	  eyewitness	  identification)	  is	  difficult,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  a	  correct	  response	  is	  also	  high	  (e.g.,	  avoiding	  the	  social	  costs	  contradiction)	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  conformity	  rates	  to	  increase,	  regardless	  of	  individual	  differences	  in	  social	  avoidance.	  	  	  	   Future	  research	  should	  expand	  upon	  the	  present	  research	  by	  exploring	  how	  other	  manipulations	  of	  the	  social	  context	  –	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  authority	  figure,	  or	  requiring	  participants	  to	  provide	  public	  confidence	  ratings	  –	  would	  influence	  conformity	  rates.	  It	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  continue	  building	  upon	  the	  findings	  from	  Experiment	  2	  by	  drawing	  on	  the	  characteristics	  that	  shape	  the	  social	  context	  during	  eyewitness	  identification	  procedures.	  Such	  an	  endeavor	  would	  foster	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  social	  context	  influences	  conformity	  rates	  in	  an	  applied	  setting.	  	  
Conformity	  to	  Old	  and	  New	  Photos	  	   In	  an	  effort	  to	  contribute	  evidence	  to	  help	  resolve	  an	  empirical	  discrepancy,	  Experiment	  2	  sought	  to	  determine	  whether	  people	  are	  1)	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  by	  reporting	  a	  previously	  unseen	  item	  as	  previously	  seen,	  than	  they	  are	  to	  conform	  by	  report	  a	  previously	  seen	  item	  as	  previously	  unseen	  (Wright,	  Matthews,	  &	  Skagerberg,	  2005;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  or	  2)	  equally	  as	  likely	  to	  conform	  in	  either	  
SOCIAL	  ANXIETY	  AND	  MEMORY	  CONFORMITY	   58	  
direction	  (Wright,	  Self,	  &	  Justice,	  2000).	  However,	  results	  from	  Experiment	  2	  demonstrate	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  and	  report	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  old	  (previously	  seen),	  when	  it	  was	  actually	  new	  (previously	  unseen).	  Given	  that	  Experiment	  2	  actually	  expanded	  the	  discrepancy,	  it	  is	  worth	  comparing	  the	  studies	  in	  attempt	  to	  determine	  the	  potential	  source	  of	  the	  discrepancy.	  	  	   There	  are	  two	  notable	  differences	  between	  Experiment	  2	  and	  the	  studies	  that	  found	  different	  patterns	  of	  conformity	  for	  previously	  seen	  and	  previously	  unseen	  items	  (Wright,	  Self,	  &	  Justice,	  2000;	  Wright,	  Matthews,	  &	  Skagerberg,	  2005;	  Wright	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  First,	  Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice	  (2000)	  used	  a	  storybook	  method	  that	  required	  participants	  to	  view	  a	  series	  of	  photos	  that	  depicted	  a	  theft	  in	  a	  bar,	  and	  subsequently	  recall	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  scene.	  The	  critical	  item	  was	  an	  accomplice,	  who	  was	  present	  in	  one	  pair	  member’s	  storybook,	  and	  absent	  in	  the	  other.	  Participants	  were	  equally	  as	  likely	  to	  conform	  and	  report	  that	  there	  was	  no	  accomplice,	  as	  they	  were	  to	  report	  that	  there	  was	  an	  accomplice.	  In	  Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice’s	  study,	  the	  direction	  of	  conformity	  was	  determined	  using	  a	  single	  critical	  item,	  as	  opposed	  to	  60,	  which	  is	  the	  number	  of	  chances	  that	  each	  participant	  had	  to	  conform	  in	  Experiment	  2.	  Moreover,	  the	  number	  of	  participant	  pairs	  that	  Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice	  based	  their	  assertion	  on	  (15)	  was	  relatively	  small	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  of	  participant	  pairs	  used	  in	  Experiment	  2	  (59).	  Therefore	  the	  different	  patterns	  of	  conformity	  for	  old	  and	  new	  items	  in	  Experiment	  2	  and	  Wright,	  Self,	  and	  Justice’s	  study	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  different	  number	  of	  critical	  items	  or	  participants.	  The	  discrepancy	  could	  also	  reflect	  a	  different	  effect	  of	  conformity	  based	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  participants	  view	  complex	  scenes	  or	  faces.	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   Perhaps	  the	  most	  illuminating	  difference	  between	  the	  stimuli	  in	  Experiment	  2	  and	  the	  stimuli	  in	  Wright,	  Matthews,	  and	  Skagerberg’s	  (2005)	  study	  and	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  (2012)	  study	  is	  that	  the	  faces	  in	  Experiment	  2	  were	  of	  Black	  men,	  whereas	  the	  other	  studies	  used	  photos	  of	  White	  faces.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  conformity	  pattern	  for	  previously	  seen	  and	  previously	  unseen	  photos	  involves	  cross-­‐racial	  identifications	  and	  the	  other-­‐race	  effect	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001).	  The	  other-­‐race	  effect	  has	  been	  widely	  documented	  across	  numerous	  studies	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  methodologies	  (Wells	  &	  Olson,	  2001).	  Experiment	  2	  required	  the	  majority	  (90%)	  of	  participants	  to	  make	  cross-­‐racial	  identifications.	  Meissner	  and	  Brigham	  (2001)	  report	  that	  a	  White	  eyewitness	  is	  56%	  more	  likely	  to	  misidentify	  a	  Black	  suspect	  who	  is	  innocent,	  than	  they	  are	  to	  misidentify	  a	  White	  suspect	  who	  is	  innocent.	  Thus,	  when	  making	  a	  cross	  racial	  identification,	  White	  eyewitnesses	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  that	  a	  Black	  suspect	  had	  been	  seen	  (i.e.,	  was	  “old”)	  when	  in	  fact	  the	  witness	  had	  never	  seen	  the	  Black	  suspect	  before	  (i.e.,was	  “new”).	  Indeed,	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  in	  Experiment	  2	  reflects	  the	  same	  tendency:	  participants,	  90%	  of	  whom	  were	  making	  a	  cross	  racial	  identification,	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  and	  report	  that	  a	  photo	  was	  old,	  when	  it	  was	  actually	  new.	  Future	  research	  should	  explore	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  conformity	  on	  old	  and	  new	  photos	  by	  developing	  a	  paradigm	  that	  requires	  participants	  to	  make	  both	  same-­‐race	  and	  cross-­‐race	  identifications.	  
General	  Discussion	  	   The	  experiments	  reported	  here	  showed	  that	  the	  social	  context	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  eyewitness	  performance.	  Although	  Experiments	  1A	  and	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1B	  did	  not	  produce	  the	  expected	  results,	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  did	  not	  increase	  participants’	  state	  anxiety	  does	  not	  reflect	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  social	  context;	  rather,	  the	  results	  from	  Experiment	  1B	  simply	  suggest	  that	  the	  context	  shaped	  participants’	  experiences	  in	  an	  unforeseen	  way.	  In	  Experiment	  1B,	  when	  compared	  to	  participants	  in	  the	  no-­‐mirror	  condition,	  participants	  in	  the	  mirror-­‐condition	  reported	  caring	  less	  about	  providing	  a	  correct	  response	  and	  caring	  less	  about	  performing	  above	  average.	  Though	  the	  mirror	  did	  not	  produce	  anxiety	  as	  expected,	  Mor	  and	  Winquist’s	  (2002)	  meta-­‐analysis	  revealed	  that	  across	  226	  studies,	  depression	  was	  more	  strongly	  associated	  with	  self-­‐focus	  –	  which	  is	  commonly	  induced	  with	  mirrors	  –	  than	  anxiety.	  Thus,	  the	  social	  context	  in	  Experiment	  1B	  did	  produce	  a	  meaningful	  effect:	  it	  evoked	  depressive	  symptoms.	  	  	   Certainly,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  if	  the	  social	  context	  in	  Experiments	  1A	  and	  1B	  had	  been	  manipulated	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  participants	  might	  have	  experienced	  anxiety.	  One	  limitation	  of	  Experiments	  1A	  and	  1B	  was	  that	  participants	  viewed	  a	  crime	  video	  and	  were	  thus	  aware	  that	  they	  were	  not	  witnessing	  a	  true	  crime	  and	  that	  there	  was	  no	  consequence	  for	  making	  an	  inaccurate	  identification.	  In	  retrospect,	  it	  would	  have	  made	  sense	  to	  incorporate	  a	  design	  component	  that	  bolstered	  the	  study’s	  ecological	  validity	  and	  led	  participants	  to	  feel	  more	  emotionally	  involved	  as	  eyewitnesses.	  For	  example,	  what	  if	  participants	  witnessed	  a	  staged	  crime	  and	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  involvement	  would	  produce	  a	  consequence	  for	  a	  fellow	  student?	  What	  if	  participants	  witnessed	  the	  “crime”	  with	  a	  co-­‐witness	  and	  could	  therefore	  be	  contradicted?	  Shaw	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  found	  that	  when	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  of	  being	  contradicted	  by	  a	  co-­‐witness,	  eyewitnesses	  will	  use	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confidence	  as	  an	  impression	  management	  tool	  and	  either	  increase	  or	  decrease	  their	  public	  confidence	  reports,	  depending	  on	  the	  social	  context.	  Might	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  contradicted	  influence	  anxiety	  and	  identification	  performance?	  	  Would	  the	  effects	  differ	  if	  the	  co-­‐witness	  was	  a	  friend	  or	  someone	  with	  whom	  the	  participant	  had	  previously	  argued?	  Perhaps	  in	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  mirror	  would	  have	  had	  a	  different	  effect	  on	  anxiety.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  limitations	  inherent	  to	  studying	  eyewitness	  performance,	  as	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  ethical	  to	  try	  and	  establish	  in	  a	  lab	  the	  type	  of	  environment	  that	  one	  might	  find	  in	  a	  real	  case.	  Still,	  Experiments	  1A	  and	  1B	  would	  have	  benefitted	  from	  additional	  changes	  to	  produce	  a	  stronger	  effect.	  	  	   The	  effect	  of	  the	  social	  context	  on	  eyewitness	  performance	  was	  more	  pronounced	  in	  Experiment	  2,	  which	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  social	  context	  can	  overshadow	  the	  effect	  of	  social	  avoidance	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  continue	  exploring	  how	  conformity	  may	  differ	  in	  other	  social	  contexts.	  Experiment	  2	  revealed	  that	  participants’	  friend	  status	  (i.e.	  friends	  with	  partner,	  not	  friends	  with	  partner)	  accounted	  for	  variance	  in	  participants’	  conformity	  scores.	  Upon	  further	  analysis	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  both	  socially	  avoidant	  and	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  conform	  when	  they	  completed	  the	  recognition	  task	  with	  a	  friend,	  than	  they	  were	  to	  conform	  when	  they	  completed	  the	  recognition	  task	  with	  someone	  who	  they	  did	  not	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  friend.	  Previously,	  researchers	  have	  reported	  that	  memory	  conformity	  is	  greater	  among	  friends	  (Hope	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  and	  romantic	  partners	  (French	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  than	  among	  strangers.	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  ensure	  that	  partners	  were	  not	  friends;	  however,	  due	  to	  recruitment	  restraints	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  sample	  was	  drawn	  from	  a	  small	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residential	  college,	  many	  students	  had	  previously	  interacted	  with	  their	  partner,	  and	  some	  considered	  themselves	  to	  be	  friends	  with	  each	  other.	  Future	  research	  should	  either	  manipulate	  relationship	  status	  or	  ensure	  that	  all	  participants	  have	  the	  same	  relationship	  with	  their	  partner	  (i.e.,	  all	  friends,	  or	  all	  strangers),	  as	  relationship	  status	  has	  a	  clear	  effect	  on	  memory	  conformity.	  	  	   One	  potential	  direction	  for	  future	  research	  involving	  relationship	  status	  and	  memory	  conformity	  is	  to	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  empathy.	  Although	  Experiment	  2	  did	  not	  find	  empathy	  to	  be	  related	  to	  conformity,	  previous	  research	  has	  found	  empathy	  to	  be	  positively	  correlated	  with	  conformity,	  but	  only	  when	  participants	  were	  unacquainted	  (D.	  Wright,	  personal	  communication,	  December	  6,	  2012).	  Seldom	  studied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  witness	  performance,	  empathy	  is	  an	  intriguing	  variable	  to	  consider.	  Might	  friends	  be	  more	  empathetic	  toward	  each	  other	  and	  thus	  more	  susceptible	  to	  conformity	  than	  strangers,	  or	  more	  susceptible	  than	  a	  dyad	  that	  has	  been	  primed	  for	  competition?	  Might	  the	  effect	  of	  friend	  status	  on	  memory	  conformity	  change	  as	  a	  function	  of	  empathy?	  Certainly,	  future	  research	  should	  continue	  to	  explore	  the	  nuanced	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  social	  context	  and	  individual	  differences	  interact	  and	  influence	  conformity.	  	  
Limitations	  	   A	  primary	  limitation	  of	  the	  present	  research	  is	  that	  the	  sample	  was	  drawn	  from	  a	  relatively	  homogenous	  college	  sample,	  which	  prohibits	  generalization	  beyond	  the	  sample	  characteristics.	  Notably,	  there	  are	  two	  particular	  distinctions	  to	  affirm	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  unfounded	  generalization.	  First,	  the	  sample	  from	  Experiment	  2	  was	  not	  drawn	  from	  a	  population	  of	  people	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	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Disorder.	  Though	  it	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  some	  participants	  have	  or	  had	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  lifetime	  prevalence	  is	  high,	  the	  findings	  from	  Experiment	  2	  should	  not	  be	  generalized	  to	  a	  clinical	  sample	  (Heimberg	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  However,	  it	  is	  intriguing	  that	  the	  mean	  social	  avoidance	  scores	  in	  Experiment	  2	  were	  significantly	  higher	  than	  a	  sample	  of	  non-­‐anxious	  controls,	  but	  significantly	  lower	  than	  a	  sample	  of	  people	  with	  Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  (Heimberg	  &	  Holaway,	  2007).	  Wright	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  used	  the	  Liebowitz	  Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  to	  assess	  social	  avoidance	  within	  their	  college	  sample;	  however,	  Wright	  et	  al.	  did	  not	  report	  their	  avoidance	  scores	  for	  comparison.	  Though	  the	  source	  of	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  avoidance	  scores	  from	  Experiment	  2	  and	  the	  avoidance	  scores	  from	  Heimberg	  &	  Holaway’s	  study	  is	  unclear,	  Heimberg	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  reports	  that	  when	  compared	  to	  older	  adults,	  the	  incidence	  of	  social	  anxiety	  appears	  to	  be	  increasing	  among	  young	  adults.	  Though	  purely	  speculative,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  there	  is	  a	  particular	  cohort	  effect	  that	  caused	  participants	  in	  Experiment	  2	  to	  have	  higher	  social	  avoidance	  scores	  than	  older	  adults,	  but	  not	  high	  enough	  to	  be	  comparable	  to	  a	  clinical	  sample.	  	  	   Second,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  cautious	  about	  generalizing	  the	  rates	  of	  conformity	  since	  Experiment	  2	  required	  the	  majority	  of	  participants	  (90%)	  to	  make	  cross-­‐racial	  identifications.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  cross-­‐racial	  identifications	  are	  known	  to	  reduce	  identification	  accuracy	  (Olson	  &	  Wells,	  2001).	  One	  potential	  avenue	  for	  future	  research	  would	  be	  to	  determine	  if	  conformity	  rates	  are	  different	  for	  cross-­‐race	  and	  same-­‐race	  identifications.	  Researchers	  might	  also	  explore	  how	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manipulating	  the	  racial	  composition	  of	  the	  dyad	  might	  influence	  conformity,	  and	  whether	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  avoidance	  and	  the	  social	  context	  would	  be	  the	  same.	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	  conformity	  effects	  observed	  in	  the	  laboratory	  in	  the	  current	  research	  have	  real	  and	  profound	  implications	  for	  actual	  criminal	  cases.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  wrongful	  convictions	  that	  have	  stemmed	  from	  co-­‐witness	  misidentifications,	  Garrett	  (2011)	  posits:	  	  “One	  wonders	  how	  separate	  individuals	  could	  have	  all	  made	  the	  same	  mistake”	  (p.	  50).	  Richard	  Alexander	  was	  misidentified	  by	  multiple	  eyewitnesses	  and	  wrongfully	  convicted	  on	  10	  charges	  –	  including	  rape,	  robbery,	  and	  burglary	  –	  and	  sentenced	  to	  70	  years	  in	  prison	  (The	  Innocence	  Project,	  2012).	  Prior	  to	  making	  their	  identifications,	  the	  witnesses	  in	  Alexander’s	  case	  all	  spent	  time	  in	  the	  same	  room,	  looking	  at	  the	  photo-­‐array	  together	  (Garret).	  In	  light	  of	  the	  evidence	  from	  Experiment	  2,	  it	  seems	  clear	  and	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  witnesses	  made	  the	  same	  error.	  Yet,	  the	  witnesses	  in	  the	  Alexander	  case	  are	  not	  to	  blame,	  as	  memory	  conformity	  reflects	  an	  adaptive	  process	  (Schacter,	  Guerin,	  &	  St.	  Jacques,	  2011).	  Schacter	  et	  al.	  report	  that	  errant	  memories	  are	  likely	  the	  result	  of	  an	  adaptive	  memory	  system	  that	  “flexibly	  incorporates	  relevant	  new	  information	  in	  order	  to	  update	  memory”	  (p.	  470).	  In	  daily	  social	  exchanges,	  the	  ability	  to	  incorporate	  new	  information	  and	  update	  memory	  is	  undeniably	  advantageous	  and	  a	  desirable	  capability	  that	  likely	  produces	  few	  consequences,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  one’s	  memory	  updates	  are	  accurate.	  However,	  in	  a	  legal	  context	  where	  the	  consequence	  of	  an	  adaptive	  memory	  system	  leads	  to	  memory	  conformity	  and	  the	  wrongful	  conviction	  of	  an	  innocent	  person,	  the	  effects	  are	  devastating.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	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imperative	  to	  continue	  to	  identify	  and	  mitigate	  the	  factors	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  memory	  conformity.	  As	  Wright	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  aptly	  notes,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  how	  co-­‐witnesses	  come	  to	  identify	  the	  same	  suspect.	  Did	  each	  co-­‐witness	  identify	  the	  same	  suspect	  on	  his	  or	  her	  own,	  without	  knowledge	  of	  his	  or	  her	  co-­‐witnesses	  report?	  Or,	  was	  one	  person’s	  memory	  “incorporated	  into	  others’	  memories”	  (Wright	  et	  al.,	  p.	  83)?	  These	  questions	  are	  not	  ones	  that	  can	  be	  readily	  answered,	  but	  by	  continuing	  to	  build	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  memory	  conformity,	  we	  can	  continue	  to	  work	  toward	  strengthening	  our	  justice	  system	  and	  reducing	  the	  incidence	  of	  wrongful	  convictions.	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Table	  1:	  Lineup	  Member	  Identification	  Frequency	  –	  Experiment	  1A	  
	  	  
	  
	   	  
	   Lineup	  member	   Frequency	   Percent	  	   no	  identification	   7	   23.3	  	   1	   7	   23.3	  	   2	   0	   0	  	   3	   5	   16.7	  	   4	   2	   6.7	  	   5	   3	   10	  	   6	   5	   16.7	  	   Total	   29	   96.7	  	   Missing	   1	   3.3	  Total	   	   30	   100.00	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Table	  2:	  Mean	  “Try”	  and	  “Care”	  Scores	  for	  Mirror	  and	  No-­‐Mirror	  Conditions	  –	  Experiment	  1A	  
	   	   Anxiety	  Condition	   	  	   No-­‐mirror	   Mirror	   t	   df	   p	  Try	   4.60	   4.60	   0.00	   28	   1.00	  Care	   4.73	   4.53	   0.40	   28	   .68	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Table	  3:	  Mean	  POMS-­‐SF	  Scores	  for	  Mirror	  and	  No-­‐Mirror	  Conditions	  –	  Experiment	  1A	  
	  	   Anxiety	  Condition	   	  	   No-­‐mirror	   Mirror	   t	   p	  Vigor-­‐Activity	  	   1.7	   1.73	   -­‐0.08	   .92	  Depression-­‐Dejection	   0.70	   0.70	   0.00	   1.00	  Confusion-­‐Bewilderment	   1.03	   1.28	   -­‐0.95	   .48	  Tension-­‐Anxiety	   1.34	   1.45	   -­‐0.31	   .75	  Anger-­‐Hostility	   0.49	   0.68	   -­‐0.84	   .40	  Fatigue-­‐Inertia	   1.61	   1.65	   -­‐0.11	   .90	  
note.	  df	  =	  28	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Table	  4:	  Mean	  State	  Anxiety	  Scores	  for	  Mirror	  and	  No-­‐Mirror	  Conditions	  –	  Experiment	  1A	  
	  	   Anxiety	  Condition	   	  	   No-­‐mirror	   Mirror	   t	   df	   p	  State	  Anxiety	   38.33	   39.73	   -­‐0.40	   26	   .68	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Table	  5:	  Lineup	  Member	  Identification	  Frequency	  –	  Experiment	  1B	  	  	   Lineup	  member	   Frequency	   Percent	  	   1	   6	   25.0	  	   2	   0	   0	  	   3	   10	   41.7	  	   4	   2	   8.3	  	   5	   0	   0	  	   6	   5	   20.8	  	   Total	   23	   95.8	  	   Missing	   1	   4.2	  Total	   	   24	   100.00	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Table	  6:	  Mean	  Task	  Engagement	  Scores	  for	  Mirror	  v.	  No-­‐Mirror	  Conditions	  –	  Experiment	  1A	  
	  	   Anxiety	  Condition	   	  	   No-­‐mirror	   Mirror	   t	   df	   p	  Try	  	   4.5	   4.5	   0.92	   22	   .36	  Care	  	   5.09	   4.08	   2.74	   22	   .01*	  Desire	   5.04	   3.92	   2.30	   22	   .03*	  
note.	  *p	  <	  .05	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Table	  7:	  Mean	  POMS-­‐SF	  Scores	  for	  Mirror	  and	  No-­‐Mirror	  Conditions	  –	  Experiment	  1B	  
	   	   Anxiety	  Condition	   	  	   No-­‐mirror	   Mirror	   t	   p	  vigor-­‐activity	  	   1.63	   1.94	   -­‐0.92	   .36	  depression-­‐dejection	   0.52	   0.82	   -­‐1.33	   .19	  confusion-­‐bewilderment	   1.30	   1.36	   -­‐0.24	   .81	  tension-­‐anxiety	   1.36	   1.64	   -­‐0.72	   .47	  anger-­‐hostility	   0.77	   0.74	   0.10	   .91	  fatigue-­‐inertia	   1.72	   1.80	   -­‐0.19	   .85	  
note.	  df	  =	  22	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Figure	  1:	  Predicted	  Results	  –	  Experiment	  2	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Figure	  2:	  Significant	  Interaction	  Between	  Social	  Avoidance	  Grouping	  and	  Instructions	  –	  
Experiment	  2	  	  
	  	  
	  
















y	   Non-­‐Socially	  Avoidant	  Socially	  Avoidant	  
*	  
SOCIAL	  ANXIETY	  AND	  MEMORY	  CONFORMITY	   84	  
Appendix	  A:	  Confidence	  and	  Task	  Engagement	  Questionnaire	  –	  Experiment	  1	  	  
	  
AGE	  __________________	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gender	  (circle):	  M	  	   F	  
	  
Please	  read	  each	  statement	  carefully	  and	  indicate	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  
(extremely)	  how	  much	  each	  statement	  applies	  to	  you.	  	  
	  1.	  How	  confident	  are	  you	  that	  you	  correctly	  identified	  the	  perpetrator?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  2.	  To	  what	  extent	  were	  you	  guessing	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  3.	  How	  hard	  did	  you	  try	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  4.	  How	  much	  did	  you	  care	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  this	  study?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  5.	  How	  much	  desire	  did	  you	  have	  to	  be	  above	  average	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	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Appendix	  B:	  Profile	  of	  Mood	  States	  Short	  Form	  (POMS-­‐SF)	  “Below	  is	  a	  list	  of	  words	  that	  describe	  feelings	  people	  have.	  Please	  read	  each	  one	  carefully.	  Then	  fill	  in	  ONE	  circle	  under	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  right	  which	  best	  describes	  HOW	  YOU	  HAVE	  BEEN	  FEELING	  DURING	  THE	  PAST	  WEEK	  INCLUDING	  TODAY.”	  (Schacham,	  1983).	   	  	  0	  =	  Not	  at	  all	  1	  =	  A	  little	  2	  =	  Moderately	  3	  =	  Quite	  a	  bit	  4	  =	  Extremely	  
































1.	   Tense	  ……………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  2.	   Angry	  ……………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  3.	   Worn	  out	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  4.	   Unhappy	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  5.	   Lively	  ………………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  6.	   Confused	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  7.	   Peeved	  ……………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  8.	   Sad	  ………………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  9.	   Active	  ………………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  10.	   On	  edge	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  11.	   Grouchy	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  12.	   Blue	  ………………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  13.	   Energetic	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  14.	   Hopeless	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	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15.	   Uneasy	  ……………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  16.	   Restless	  ……………………..	  	   	   	   	   	   	  17.	   Unable	  to	  concentrate	  ………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  18.	   Fatigued	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  19.	   Annoyed	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  20.	   Discouraged	  ………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  21.	   Resentful	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  22.	   Nervous	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  23.	   Miserable	  …………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  24.	   Cheerful	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  25.	   Bitter	  ………………………..	  	   	   	   	   	   	  26.	   Exhausted	  …………………..	  	   	   	   	   	   	  27.	   Anxious	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  28.	   Helpless	  …………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  29.	   Weary	  ………………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  30.	   Bewildered	  …………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  31.	   Furious	  ……………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  32.	   Full	  of	  pep	  ………………….	  	   	   	   	   	   	  33.	   Worthless	  …………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	  34.	   Forgetful	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  35.	   Vigorous	  ……………………	  	   	   	   	   	   	  36.	   Uncertain	  about	  things	  ……..	  	   	   	   	   	   	  37.	   Bushed	  ……………………...	  	   	   	   	   	   	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Appendix	  C:	  State-­‐Trait	  Anxiety	  Inventory	  (STAI)	  
DIRECTIONS:	  	  A	  number	  of	  statements	  which	  people	  have	  used	  to	  describe	  themselves	  are	  given	  below.	  Read	  each	  statement	  and	  then	  circle	  the	  appropriate	  number	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  statement	  to	  indicate	  how	  you	  feel	  right	  now,	  that	  is,	  at	  this	  moment.	  There	  are	  no	  right	  or	  wrong	  answers.	  Do	  not	  spend	  too	  much	  time	  on	  any	  one	  statement	  but	  give	  the	  answer	  which	  seems	  to	  describe	  your	  present	  feelings	  best.	  	  	  1.	  I	  feel	  calm………………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  2.	  I	  feel	  secure……………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  3.	  I	  am	  tense………………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  4.	  I	  feel	  strained…………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  5.	  I	  feel	  at	  ease……………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  6.	  I	  feel	  upset…………...………………………………………………………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  7.	  I	  am	  presently	  worrying	  over	  possible	  misfortunes……………….…….......1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  8.	  I	  feel	  satisfied…………………………………………..…………………………………......1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  9.	  I	  feel	  frightened………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  10.	  I	  feel	  comfortable………………………………………………….………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  11.	  I	  feel	  self-­‐confident…………………………………………………….…………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  12.	  I	  feel	  nervous……………………………………………………………………..…………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  13.	  I	  am	  jittery……………………………………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  14.	  I	  feel	  indecisive………………………………………………………………..…………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  15.	  I	  am	  relaxed…………………………………………………………………….……………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  16.	  I	  feel	  content………………………………………………………………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  17.	  I	  am	  worried………………………………………………………………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  18.	  I	  feel	  confused…………………………………………………….………………………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  19.	  I	  feel	  steady………………………………………………………..………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	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20.	  I	  feel	  pleasant……………………………………………………..………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  
DIRECTIONS:	  	  A	  number	  of	  statements	  which	  people	  have	  used	  to	  describe	  themselves	  are	  given	  below.	  Read	  each	  statement	  and	  then	  circle	  the	  appropriate	  number	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  statement	  to	  indicate	  how	  you	  generally	  feel	  using	  the	  following	  scale:	  	  	  1	  =	  Almost	  Never	  	  2	  =	  Sometimes	  	  3	  =	  Often	  	  4	  =	  Almost	  Always	  	  21.	  I	  feel	  pleasant…….……………………………………………………………….………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  22.	  I	  feel	  nervous	  and	  restless……….…………………………………………….……...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  23.	  I	  feel	  satisfied	  with	  myself….………………………………………………….……...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  24.	  I	  wish	  I	  could	  be	  as	  happy	  as	  others	  seem	  to	  be…...………….……………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  25.	  I	  feel	  like	  a	  failure	  ………………………………………………………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  26.	  I	  feel	  rested…………...……………………………………………………………………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  27.	  I	  am	  “calm,	  cool,	  and	  collected”……………….…………..…………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  28.	  I	  feel	  that	  difficulties	  are	  piling	  up	  so	  that	  I	  cannot	  overcome	  them…1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  29.	  I	  worry	  too	  much	  over	  something	  that	  really	  doesn’t	  matter………….	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  30.	  I	  am	  happy………………………………………………….…………………...…………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  31.	  I	  have	  disturbing	  thoughts	  ……………………………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  32.	  I	  lack	  self	  confidence.……………………………………………………….…………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  33.	  I	  feel	  secure………..………………………………………………………………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  34.	  I	  make	  decisions	  easily………...………………………………..……………………...1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  35.	  I	  feel	  inadequate..…………………………….……………………………………………1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  36.	  I	  am	  content………….……………………………………………………….……………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  37.	  Some	  unimportant	  thought	  runs	  through	  my	  mind	  and	  bothers	  me..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	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38.	  I	  take	  disappointments	  so	  keenly	  that	  I	  can’t	  put	  them	  out	  of	  my	  mind……………….	  	  ………………………..………………………………………………………...……………………..	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  39.	  I	  am	  a	  steady	  person………………………………………………………...…………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  40.	  I	  get	  in	  a	  state	  of	  tension	  or	  turmoil	  as	  I	  think	  over	  my	  recent	  concerns	  and	  interests.....………………………………………………………………………………………..1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	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Appendix	  D:	  Debrief	  (Experiment	  1)	  	   You	  have	  just	  participated	  in	  a	  study	  designed	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  will	  induce	  anxiety	  during	  an	  eyewitness	  identification	  task.	  Previous	  research	  suggests	  that	  mirrors	  can	  cause	  people	  to	  experience	  heightened	  levels	  of	  self-­‐focus	  which	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  social	  anxiety	  (Carver	  &	  Scheier,	  1978;	  Gaydukevych,	  Kocovski,	  2012).	  Therefore,	  if	  you	  were	  randomly	  selected	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  this	  study	  that	  exposed	  you	  to	  the	  one-­‐way	  mirror,	  it	  is	  normal	  to	  feel	  anxious.	  	  	   Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  common	  for	  police	  interrogation	  rooms	  to	  contain	  one-­‐way	  mirrors,	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  determining	  if	  the	  presence	  of	  mirrors	  impacts	  anxiety,	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  effects	  it	  may	  have	  on	  confidence	  and	  decision	  making.	  By	  participating	  in	  this	  research,	  you	  are	  helping	  to	  build	  evidence	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  improve	  eyewitness	  identification	  procedures	  and	  accuracy.	  	   Moreover,	  all	  participants	  who	  made	  an	  identification	  in	  this	  study	  made	  a	  mistaken	  identification	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  actual	  culprit	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  photospread.	  This	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  make	  it	  easy	  to	  make	  a	  misidentification	  and	  selecting	  the	  wrong	  culprit	  is	  not	  indicative	  of	  memory	  malfunction.	  In	  fact,	  eyewitness	  misidentifications	  are	  common	  in	  the	  general	  population	  (Garret,	  2011).	  This	  study	  is	  intended	  to	  add	  to	  the	  existing	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  memory	  is	  malleably	  and	  can	  be	  subtly	  manipulated	  in	  the	  right	  circumstances.	  	  	  	   If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  this	  study	  please	  contact	  Alexandra	  Abry	  at	  aabry@bates.edu	  or	  Professor	  Douglass	  at	  adouglass@bates.edu.	  	  	   Please	  help	  protect	  the	  integrity	  of	  this	  study	  and	  do	  not	  discuss	  its	  purpose	  with	  other	  students.	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Appendix	  E:	  The	  Liebowitz	  Social	  Anxiety	  Scale	  (LSAS)	  
	  
Directions:	  	  Read	  each	  situation	  carefully	  and	  answer	  two	  questions	  about	  that	  situation.	  The	  first	  question	  asks	  how	  anxious	  or	  fearful	  you	  feel	  in	  the	  situation.	  The	  second	  question	  asks	  how	  often	  you	  avoid	  the	  situation.	  	  	  If	  you	  come	  across	  a	  situation	  that	  you	  ordinarily	  do	  not	  experience,	  we	  ask	  that	  you	  imagine	  "what	  if	  you	  were	  faced	  with	  that	  situation,"	  and	  then	  rate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  you	  would	  fear	  this	  hypothetical	  situation	  and	  how	  often	  you	  would	  tend	  to	  avoid	  it.	  Please	  base	  your	  ratings	  on	  the	  way	  that	  the	  situations	  have	  affected	  you	  in	  the	  last	  week.	  
	  
	  	   	   0	  =	  None	  1	  =	  Mild	  2	  =	  Moderate	  3	  =	  Severe	  
0	  =	  Never	  1	  =	  Occasionally	  2	  =	  Often	  3	  =	  Usually	  	  	   	   	   Fear/Anxiety	   Avoid	  
	  1.	   Telephoning	  in	  public	  	   	   	   	  2.	   Participating	  in	  small	  groups	  	   	   	   	  3.	   Eating	  in	  public	  places	  	   	   	   	  4.	   Drinking	  with	  others	  in	  public	  places	  	   	   	   	  5.	   Talking	  to	  people	  in	  authority	  	   	   	   	  6.	   Acting,	  performing	  or	  giving	  a	  talk	  in	  front	  of	  an	  audience	   	   	   	  7.	   Going	  to	  a	  party	  	   	   	   	  8.	   Working	  while	  being	  observed	  	   	   	   	  9.	   Writing	  while	  being	  observed	  	   	   	   	  10.	   Calling	  someone	  you	  don’t	  know	  very	  well	  	  	   	   	   	  11.	   Talking	  with	  people	  you	  don’t	  know	  very	  well	  	   	   	   	  12.	   Meeting	  strangers	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   0	  =	  None	  1	  =	  Mild	  2	  =	  Moderate	  3	  =	  Severe	  
0	  =	  Never	  1	  =	  Occasionally	  2	  =	  Often	  3	  =	  Usually	  	  	   	   	   Fear/Anxiety	   Avoid	  
	  13.	   Urinating	  in	  a	  public	  bathroom	  	   	   	   	  14.	   Entering	  a	  room	  when	  others	  are	  already	  seated	   	   	   	  15.	   Being	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  	   	   	   	  16.	   Speaking	  up	  at	  a	  meeting	  	   	   	   	  17.	   Taking	  a	  test	  	   	   	   	  18.	   Expressing	  a	  disagreement	  or	  disapproval	  to	  people	  you	  don’t	  know	  very	  well	   	   	   	  19.	   Looking	  at	  people	  you	  don’t	  know	  very	  well	  in	  the	  eyes	   	   	   	  20.	   Giving	  a	  report	  to	  a	  group	  	   	   	   	  21.	   Trying	  to	  pick	  up	  someone	  	   	   	   	  22.	   Returning	  goods	  to	  a	  store	  	   	   	   	  23.	   Giving	  a	  party	  	   	   	   	  24.	   Resisting	  a	  high	  pressure	  salesperson	  	   	   	   	  Total	  (P)	  Performance	  	   	   	  Total	  (S)	  Social	  Interaction	  	   	   	  Total	  Score	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Appendix	  F:	  The	  Empathy	  Quotient	  (EQ-­‐40)	  
	  
Directions:	  Below	  are	  a	  list	  of	  statements.	  Please	  read	  each	  statement	  very	  carefully	  and	  rate	  
how	  strongly	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  it.	  There	  are	  no	  right	  or	  wrong	  answers,	  or	  trick	  
questions.	  
	   1.	  I	  can	  easily	  tell	  if	  someone	  else	  wants	  to	  enter	  a	  conversation.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  2.	  I	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  explain	  to	  others	  things	  that	  I	  understand	  easily,	  when	  they	  don't	  understand	  it	  first	  time.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  	  3.	  I	  really	  enjoy	  caring	  for	  other	  people.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  4.	  I	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  know	  what	  to	  do	  in	  a	  social	  situation.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  5.	  People	  often	  tell	  me	  that	  I	  went	  too	  far	  in	  driving	  my	  point	  home	  in	  a	  discussion.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  6.	  It	  doesn't	  bother	  me	  too	  much	  if	  I	  am	  late	  meeting	  a	  friend.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  7.	  Friendships	  and	  relationships	  are	  just	  too	  difficult,	  so	  I	  tend	  not	  to	  bother	  with	  them.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  8.	  I	  often	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  judge	  if	  something	  is	  rude	  or	  polite.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  9.	  In	  a	  conversation,	  I	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  my	  own	  thoughts	  rather	  than	  on	  what	  my	  listener	  might	  be	  thinking.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  10.	  When	  I	  was	  a	  child,	  I	  enjoyed	  cutting	  up	  worms	  to	  see	  what	  would	  happen.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  11.	  I	  can	  pick	  up	  quickly	  if	  someone	  says	  one	  thing	  but	  means	  another.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  12.	  It	  is	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  see	  why	  some	  things	  upset	  people	  so	  much.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	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  13.	  I	  find	  it	  easy	  to	  put	  myself	  in	  somebody	  else's	  shoes.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  14.	  I	  am	  good	  at	  predicting	  how	  someone	  will	  feel.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  15.	  I	  am	  quick	  to	  spot	  when	  someone	  in	  a	  group	  is	  feeling	  awkward	  or	  uncomfortable.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  16.	  If	  I	  say	  something	  that	  someone	  else	  is	  offended	  by,	  I	  think	  that	  that's	  their	  problem,	  not	  mine.	  	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  17.	  If	  anyone	  asked	  me	  if	  I	  liked	  their	  haircut,	  I	  would	  reply	  truthfully,	  even	  if	  I	  didn't	  like	  it.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  18.	  I	  can't	  always	  see	  why	  someone	  should	  have	  felt	  offended	  by	  a	  remark.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  19.	  Seeing	  people	  cry	  doesn't	  really	  upset	  me.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  20.	  I	  am	  very	  blunt,	  which	  some	  people	  take	  to	  be	  rudeness,	  even	  though	  this	  is	  unintentional.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  21.	  I	  don’t	  tend	  to	  find	  social	  situations	  confusing.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  22.	  Other	  people	  tell	  me	  I	  am	  good	  at	  understanding	  how	  they	  are	  feeling	  and	  what	  they	  are	  thinking.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  23.	  When	  I	  talk	  to	  people,	  I	  tend	  to	  talk	  about	  their	  experiences	  rather	  than	  my	  own.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  24.	  It	  upsets	  me	  to	  see	  an	  animal	  in	  pain.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  25.	  I	  am	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  without	  being	  influenced	  by	  people's	  feelings.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  26.	  I	  can	  easily	  tell	  if	  someone	  else	  is	  interested	  or	  bored	  with	  what	  I	  am	  saying.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	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  27.	  I	  get	  upset	  if	  I	  see	  people	  suffering	  on	  news	  programs.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  28.	  Friends	  usually	  talk	  to	  me	  about	  their	  problems	  as	  they	  say	  that	  I	  am	  very	  understanding.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  29.	  I	  can	  sense	  if	  I	  am	  intruding,	  even	  if	  the	  other	  person	  doesn't	  tell	  me.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  30.	  People	  sometimes	  tell	  me	  that	  I	  have	  gone	  too	  far	  with	  teasing.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  31.	  Other	  people	  often	  say	  that	  I	  am	  insensitive,	  though	  I	  don’t	  always	  see	  why.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  32.	  If	  I	  see	  a	  stranger	  in	  a	  group,	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  them	  to	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  join	  in.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  33.	  I	  usually	  stay	  emotionally	  detached	  when	  watching	  a	  film.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  34.	  I	  can	  tune	  into	  how	  someone	  else	  feels	  rapidly	  and	  intuitively.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  35.	  I	  can	  easily	  work	  out	  what	  another	  person	  might	  want	  to	  talk	  about.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  36.	  I	  can	  tell	  if	  someone	  is	  masking	  their	  true	  emotion.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  37.	  I	  don't	  consciously	  work	  out	  the	  rules	  of	  social	  situations.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  38.	  I	  am	  good	  at	  predicting	  what	  someone	  will	  do.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  39.	  I	  tend	  to	  get	  emotionally	  involved	  with	  a	  friend's	  problems.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	  	  	  40.	  I	  can	  usually	  appreciate	  the	  other	  person's	  viewpoint,	  even	  if	  I	  don't	  	  agree	  with	  it.	   strongly	  agree	   slightly	  agree	   slightly	  disagree	   strongly	  disagree	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Appendix	  G:	  Partner	  Relationship,	  Confidence	  Rating,	  and	  Task	  Engagement	  Questionnaire–	  Experiment	  2	  
	  
CODENAME:	  	  	  How	  many	  days	  ago	  did	  you	  complete	  part	  1	  of	  this	  study?	  _____________________	  	  Have	  you	  met	  your	  partner	  before?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  
	  If	  so,	  do	  you	  frequently	  spend	  time	  with	  your	  partner?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yes	  	  	  	  	  No	  	  	  	  
	  If	  so,	  are	  you	  friends	  with	  your	  partner?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yes	  	  	  	  	  No	  	  
	  
Please	  read	  each	  statement	  carefully	  and	  indicate	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  0	  (not	  at	  all)	  to	  6	  
(extremely)	  how	  much	  each	  statement	  applies	  to	  you.	  	  	  
1.	  How	  comfortable	  did	  you	  feel	  interacting	  with	  your	  partner	  during	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  
2.	  How	  confident	  are	  you	  in	  your	  accuracy	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  
3.	  To	  what	  extent	  were	  you	  guessing	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  
4.	  How	  hard	  did	  you	  try	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	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(not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  
5.	  How	  much	  did	  you	  care	  about	  giving	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  this	  study?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	  	  
6.	  How	  much	  desire	  did	  you	  have	  to	  be	  above	  average	  on	  this	  task?	  	   0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	  (not	  at	  all)	   	   	   	   	   (extremely)	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Appendix	  H:	  Debrief	  –	  Experiment	  2	  
	  	   You	  have	  just	  participated	  in	  a	  study	  designed	  to	  explore	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  individuals	  with	  a	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  social	  situations	  are	  more,	  equally,	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  report	  inaccurate	  memories	  as	  a	  function	  of	  a	  partner’s	  response.	  Previous	  research	  suggests	  that	  socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  are	  less	  susceptible	  to	  memory	  conformity	  than	  are	  non-­‐socially	  avoidant	  individuals	  (Wright,	  Busnello,	  Buratto,	  &	  Stein,	  2012).	  This	  present	  study	  seeks	  to	  replicate	  Wright	  et	  al.’s	  (2012)	  finding	  and	  to	  identify	  two	  additional	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  relationship	  may	  change.	  	  	   Participation	  in	  this	  study	  does	  not	  signify	  that	  you	  are	  socially	  avoidant.	  It	  is	  common	  to	  experience	  anxiety	  in	  certain	  social	  situations;	  however,	  some	  individuals	  who	  experience	  heightened	  levels	  of	  fear	  and	  discomfort	  amidst	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	  interactions	  may	  benefit	  from	  guidance	  to	  help	  mitigate	  social	  discomfort.	  Confidential	  and	  free	  counseling	  is	  available	  at	  the	  Bates	  College	  Health	  Center	  for	  Bates	  students.	  The	  health	  center	  can	  be	  reached	  at	  (207)-­‐786-­‐6199.	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  provision	  of	  inaccurate	  responses	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  items	  were	  “old”	  or	  “new”	  does	  not	  indicate	  memory	  malfunction	  or	  weakness.	  Rather,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  memory	  conformity	  is	  in	  part,	  the	  result	  of	  adaptive	  neurological	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  aid	  memory,	  but	  that	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  both	  true	  and	  false	  information	  that	  individuals	  are	  unable	  to	  distinguish	  between	  (Schacter,	  Guerin,	  &	  Jacques,	  2011).	  Moreover,	  various	  social	  influences	  can	  both	  increase	  and	  decrease	  the	  likelihood	  that	  an	  individual	  will	  integrate	  false	  information	  into	  his	  or	  her	  memory	  and	  later	  report	  it	  as	  being	  “true.”	  	  	   The	  goal	  of	  this	  present	  study	  was	  to	  deepen	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  individual	  differences	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  memory	  is	  most	  malleable.	  Such	  an	  understanding	  is	  important	  in	  a	  legal	  context	  in	  which	  inaccurate	  memory	  reports	  may	  have	  profound	  and	  detrimental	  consequences.	  	  By	  participating	  in	  this	  research,	  you	  are	  helping	  to	  build	  evidence	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  improve	  eyewitness	  identification	  procedures	  and	  accuracy.	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   If	  you	  have	  any	  questions	  about	  this	  study	  please	  contact	  Alexandra	  Abry	  at	  aabry@bates.edu	  or	  Professor	  Douglass	  at	  adouglas@bates.edu.	  Please	  help	  protect	  the	  integrity	  of	  this	  study	  and	  do	  not	  discuss	  its	  purpose	  with	  other	  students.	  	  	  
